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L Introduction
In times past, American Indian tribes were commonly stereotyped as a
collection of rudimentary craftsmen and artisans living on federally
established and impoverished reservations that commonly served as mere
venues for, among other things, elementary school field trips. Over the past
twenty years, American Indian tribes have evolved and progressed from
federal welfare beneficiaries into major entrepreneurial entities thriving in
a multitude of commercial, profit-driven endeavors. These tribes' "business-
like demeanor" is particularly manifested as tribes own and/or operate, for
example, smoke shops, fuel stations, convenience stores, casinos, hotels, golf
courses, agribusinesses, and banks on more than 300 Indian reservations
located throughout the United States.
This dramatic economic proliferation is attributed, in part, to the fact that
Indian tribes in America are located on lands providing tribal businesses
unique, tax exempt venues due to the inherent status of tribes as
sovereigns For example, the Mississippi Choctaw tribe has partnered with
corporations such as American Greeting Cards, AT&T, Caterpillar,
Panasonic, Pepsi, Sylvania, Matrix Building Systems, and Ford Motor
Company, creating more than 1000 local jobs and generating approximately
$123 million in annual wages.' Specifically, the Choctaw Indian tribe,
located on approximately 29,500 acres in five counties in central Mississip-
pi, participates in more than fifteen enterprises with revenues exceeding
$200 million per year.4 The economic development and growth of Indian
tribes throughout America have created a budding middle class on Indian
reservations leading to, inter alia, the charter of at least ten banks owned and
controlled by Native Americans. It is anticipated that such economic growth
and development, along with budding political influence, will substantially
1. Gary S. Pitchlynn, Secured Transactions and Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 53
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 52, 52 (1999).
2. Jim VandeHei, Mississippi's Choctaw Find an Unlikely Ally in a GOP Stalwart,
WALL ST. J., July 3, 2000, at A .
3. Id.; Native Americans Move into the Banking Business as Their Assets Grow, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 30, 2000, at Al; Jim Garber & Megan Knox, From the Chiefs Desk - Chief
Phillip Martin, Biography, CHOCTAW TIMES, Fall 2000, at 6, 7.
4. Garber & Knox, supra note 3, at 7.
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increase over the next ten years.' As a result, Indian tribes persuade many
lawmakers to support their programs and agendas.'
The recent, dramatic success and incredible growth in the tribal gaming
industry in America has led to a boom of capital intensive projects on many
tribal lands.' Economic prosperity and accelerated expansion are common
themes on approximately 198 reservations containing some sort of gaming
operation It is emphasized here that tribes are not immune from economic
failure or financial distress (and perhaps even relief under the remedial
Bankruptcy Code).9
At some point, a tribe engaged in commercial activity will face financial
distress and need protection under established and tested insolvency laws.
As tribes continue to become commercially attractive to outside partners,
investors, and the public, the need exists for tribes to establish "legal
certainties" by adopting the necessary and predictable business codes and
designating legal fora for resolving commercial and noncommercial
disputes."0 The tribes' sovereign status as independent nations make legal
disputes frustrating and intimidating to many nontribal entities, ultimately
leading to complex, time-consuming, and expensive jurisdictional
disputes." In an effort to exude an amicable commercial disposition, tribes
oftentimes will, as a practical matter and business decision, accept
limitations or waive sovereign immunity in certain legal fora in order to
garner valuable and necessary commercial interaction with the private and
public sectors. 2
5. Id.
6. VandeHei, supra note 2.
7. Id.; Viveca Novak & Mark Thompson, The Lost Tribe?, TIME, Mar. 6, 2000, at 66,
67 (identifying and noting that the largest casino in the U.S. is located in Connecticut and
run by an Indian tribe projecting earnings of $1 million per day even with the addition of
another tribal casino in the same state); see also William Booth, Tribes Ride a Casino
Dream, WASH. POST, May 9, 2000, at AI (identifying plans for over $400 million in gaming
developments in California by Indian tribes); Pat Doyle, Red Lake Tribe Betting That Water
Par&, Hotel Will Boost Casino, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 12, 2000, at BI (discussing
the commencement of a $22 million indoor water park adjacent to a casino run by the Red
Lake Indian Tribe in Minnesota).
8. See Novak & Thompson, supra note 7, at 66, 67.
9. See generally Pitchlynn, supra note 1.
10. Id. at 53.
I1. See In re Shape, 25 B.R. 356 (D. Mont. 1982); In re Sandmar Corp., 12 B.R. 910
(D.N.M. 1981) (providing examples of the jurisdictional barriers manifested in past cases).
12. David B. Jordan, Federal Indian Law: Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Why Oklahoma
Businesses Should Revamp Legal Relationships with Indian Tribes After Kiowa Tribe v.
Manufacturing Technologies Inc., 52 OKLA. L. REV. 489, 503 (1999); Theresa R. Wilson,
Nations Within a Nation: The Evolution of Tribal Immunity, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 99, 110
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It is specifically noted that clarification of a tribe's status under the
Bankruptcy Code (the Code) is required. Intensive commercial activity and
economic development engaged in by tribes leads to the conclusion that at
some point in the future, a tribe will likely participate in a bankruptcy case
as a debtor seeking reorganization under the Code. The eligibility and status
of a tribe involved in a case or proceeding under the Code, as either a
debtor or creditor, remains in question. Query, shall tribes be eligible
entities under the Code in light of the definitions of governmental units,
persons, corporations, partnerships, or municipalities under §§ 101 and 109
of the Code?
The primary purpose and intent of this article are to analyze the past
treatment of tribes and their existing and potential treatment under the Code.
The article also demonstrates that no uniform treatment or definitive
classification of a tribe presently exists under the Code. Indeed, uncertainty
seemingly exists regarding the status, treatment, and eligibility of tribes as
participants in bankruptcy cases and proceedings. While several courts
addressed the role of tribes under the Code as a creditor, these courts
acknowledged, inter alia, the absence of the term "Indian tribe" in the
current Code.13
In essence, this article provides pertinent information for two distinct
audiences: (1) readers who know little or nothing about Native Americans
and Indian tribes in the U.S.; and (2) readers with a limited knowledge of
the Bankruptcy Code. The ultimate goal of the article is to provide
suggestions and answers, or at least more guidance, regarding the treatment,
eligibility, applicability, sovereign status, and relief available to tribes under
the Code.
Part II of the article studies the semantics, history, evolution, and status
of tribes that should be analyzed to more fully appreciate the multifarious
transformation and advancement of the American Indian tribe. Part III
provides an overview of the Code. Part IV defines and utilizes the
definitions in the Code as they relate to the eligibility, participation,
treatment, and applicability of the Code to tribes. Part V discusses the
history, origin, and ultimate impact sovereign immunity has on the tribal
eligibility issue. This Part also addresses the specific issues of sovereign
immunity in an effort to assess the eligibility and applicability of tribes as
(1999-2000).
13. Sandmar Corp., 12 B.R. 910 at 916 (acknowledging the absence of the term "Indian
tribe" in the 1978 Code but recognizing the existence of the term "Indian territory" in I 1
U.S.C. § 1(24) under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898). However, the court questioned the lack
of an explanation regarding the omission of the term in the current Code. Id.
No. 1]
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participants in cases and proceedings under the Code. Finally, Part VI
provides some conclusions.
I. The Semantics, Evolution, and Dismemberment of Native American
Culture and Resulting Titles
A. From Nations to Tribes
A study of the historical background and evolution of the status of
American Indians and modem organized Indian tribes is addressed before
even attempting to classify a formally organized group of Indians into a
"qualified entity" eligible for relief under the Code. An examination,
understanding, and appreciation of the historical development of American
Indian tribes and tribal sovereignty are addressed before the specific issues
are further discussed in this article.'
First, the development of Indian tribes as America's true first nations is
considered and appreciated.'" Europeans considered groups of Indians,
when contemplated as a collective unit, as "nations," "tribes," "bands,"'" or
"remnants of tribes."" Without further inquiry or comment, all of these
terms are functionally synonymous." An understanding and definition of
the descriptive terms defining Indians and Indian tribes must be analyzed
before applying them to the various possibilities offered under the Code. In
order to more fully appreciate and understand the semantics and relevance
of this specific classification, the term describing Indian groups as "nations"
is first developed
1. "Indian Nation" Analysis
The Europeans considered Indian settlements in the Americas as "nations"
for several reasons. Under the principles of European legal theory, the
doctrine of discovery, and natural law, the early explorers and colonists
14. John Fredericks, III, America's First Nations: The Origins, History and Future of
American Indian Sovereignty, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 347, 409 (1999).
15. Id.
16. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 6 (Rennard Strickland et
al. eds., 1982) (hereinafter COHEN]; United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1975) (utilizing the term "band" as being commonly referred to as part of a divided tribe or
portion of a larger entity formally recognized as a tribe).
17. Dan Gunter, The Technology of Tribalism: The Lehmi Indians, Federal Recognition,
and the Creation of Tribal Identity, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 92 (1998); see also VINE
DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO 2 (1969).
18. Gunter, supra note 17, at 92.
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could only acquire previously settled Indian lands through an act of war or
by entering into a treaty.' 9
The advantage of recognizing tribal settlements as "nations" is clear: in
the event a dispute over land or territory arises, two distinct sovereigns can
enter into treaties.2"
Thus, in order to facilitate settlement and land acquisition through
treaties, Europeans settling in North America treated the Indian settlements
as sovereign nations.2' The treaties also served to maintain peace among
the sovereigns and symbolized the fact that the early relationship between
Native Americans and settlers also borrowed principles from international
law.
22
For example, the English policy of recognizing Indian nations as
sovereign nations was manifested in 1763.23 When King George III issued
the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Crown revealed a "connection" 'to the
"Indian nations" and envisioned its role as a "protector" of Indian rights .2
The policy implemented by the British indicated that the Indian settlements
were viewed as independent nations, especially with respect to Indian lands
and their governments as sovereign entities.2 Additionally, the Treaty of
Fort Stanwix of 1768 firmly established the use of international instruments
in British Indian policy and reinforced the idea of tribes as sovereign
entities.
26
After the American Revolution, the United States Congress continued
Britain's policy by recognizing Indians as sovereign nations under the
Articles of Confederation. Indian nations were not considered a "part" of
the United States or under its jurisdiction. Instead, the Indian nations were
considered "protectorates" under the Articles." Accordingly, domestic
19. Id. at 93.
20. COHEN, supra note 16, at 52.
21. Gunter, supra note 17, at 93.
22. Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain
a Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1462 (1991); see also I INDIAN AFFAIRS:
LAWS AND TREATIES I (Charles Kappler ed., photo. reprint 1977) (1904); ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMs TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND
PEACE, 1600-1800, at 103 (1997).
23. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the United States to the Supreme Court of the
American Indian Nations: The Cherokee Nation of Indians, et al. v. Georgia, 8 KANS. J.L.




27. Id. at 167.
28. Id.
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disputes between Indians and Americans invoked consideration of the
principles and doctrines of international law.29 Furthermore, Indians and
their organized settlements possessed political liberty and property (i.e.,
land) as sovereigns safeguarded by the same protections afforded to other
sovereign entities. Therefore, Indian nations' land and rights could only be
taken by the utilization of treaties, trade, or force."
With the ratification of the America Constitution in 1787, Congress and
the federal government were empowered to control and regulate commerce
with Indians by virtue of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.' The
Commerce Clause, or more specifically, the "Indian Commerce Clause,"
allows Congress to regulate relationships and commerce with Indian tribes
in virtually every economic or commercial aspect; however, this "plenary
power" possessed by Congress is extremely broad but not absolute, because
it is subject to constitutional limitations and judicial review."
Likewise, the treaty power under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution
vests substantial "political power" in the Executive Branch, subject to Senate
approval, to negotiate international agreements with sovereign entities (i.e.,
Indian nations)." The treaty-making authority clarifies the role of the
federal government as the principal figure regarding Indian affairs.' The
status of American Indians as nations, or independent nations within the
meaning of the Constitution, was fixed and determined by the Supreme
Court in a line of cases known as the "Marshall Trilogy."3
The Marshall Trilogy consists of 'three cases: Johnson v. M'Intosh,
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia. In Johnson v.
M'intosh, the United States Supreme Court articulated the inherent
limitations on tribal power as a result of Indian tribes' incorporation into the
United States.3" This case actually clarified the fact that tribes lacked legal
29. COHEN, supra note 16, at 50, 58.
30. Cherokee Nation Appeal, supra note 23, at 169.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (Indians not taxed); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3
(Indian Commerce Clause); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (Indians not taxed).
32. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937) (providing protection for
Indian property rights recognized by Congress); see also Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249
U.S. 110 (1919); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (denoting the treaty power possessed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate).
34. COHEN, supra note 16, at 207.
35. AM. INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN
GOVERNMENTS 5 (1988).
36. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); see also Milner S. Ball, John
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authority to transfer and alienate their lands or enter into treaties with
sovereigns other than the United States. 7 The tribes' status as complete
sovereigns was clearly curtailed as manifested by the decision:
They [Indian tribes] were admitted to be the rightful occupants
of the soil, with legal as well as just claim to retain possession of
it, and to use it according to their own discretion, but their
[Indian tribes] rights to complete sovereignty, as independent
nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose
of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was
denied . . ..
In 1831, the United States Supreme Court again addressed the legal
interpretation of tribal status in the federal-tribal relationship in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia.9 In Cherokee Nation, the Court diminished the
independent status of tribes as nations or separate sovereigns.' Chief
Justice Marshall considered the fact that because the drafters of the
Constitution expressly distinguished "foreign nations," "several states," and
"Indian tribes" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, in the text of the
Constitution, tribes could not be considered "foreign nations" or "states."'"
Ultimately, these points lead to one question: If tribes fail to qualify as a
state or a foreign nation, what are they? The treatment of tribes as foreign
nations in one case and domestic dependent nations in another presented
multiple problems and led to the inconsistent legal treatment of tribes.
Interestingly, Chief Justice Marshall attempted to clarify the status of
tribes in relation to the federal government by utilizing parts of the
Constitution, treaties, and other international instruments.42 The Chief
Justice applied domestic law (i.e., the Indian Commerce Clause of the
Constitution) to resolve an international legal issue involving the status of
the relationship of sovereign tribes with the United States. 3 The Chief
Justice articulated and applied the term "domestic dependent nations" to
tribes, who in his opinion and interpretation of the Constitution, were under
the dominion and control of the United 'States (i.e., congressional control).'
37. Ball, supra note 36, at 1188.
38. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
39. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
40. O'Brien, supra note 22, at 1464.
41. Id.; ALFRED KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTIrTTON 204 (7th ed. 1991).
42. O'Brien, supra note 22, at 1499-1500.
43. Id.
44. Id. It is noted that the relationship between a tribe and the United States is one
similar to that of a ward to its guardian, discussed infra in relation to the trust relationship.
No. I1]
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Further, Chief Justice Marshall boldly declared that the United States had
an "unquestionable right" to Indian lands which should be voluntarily ceded
to the United States.' The Chief Justice's study of the constitutional
semantics (i.e., the framer's use of the term "domestic dependent nations"),
deliberately chosen by the framers of the Constitution in the Indian
Commerce Clause, forever ameliorated the stature of Indian settlements in
America as sovereign, independent nations.'
One year later, Chief Justice Marshall qualified and substantiated his prior
use of the term "domestic dependent nations" in Worcester v. Georgia.'7
The Chief Justice held that tribes were still considered "nations" in the sense
that a government-to-government relationship exists between the separate
tribes and the federal government under the Constitution. Thus, tribes still
possessed the right to self-government, subject only to congressional control,
free of individual state interference.'
Subsequently, tribes were viewed as a "weaker state," yet still an indepen-
dent entity existing in a trust relationship as a ward under the auspices of the
federal government. While the "Marshall Trilogy" provided the legal found-
ation upon which modern tribal sovereignty is based, the three decisions
signaled that the Federal Constitution failed to preserve the deserved status of
complete sovereignty for the nation's largest free minority - the American
Indian tribes."'
2. "Indian Tribe" Analysis
Although the Supreme Court conceived and articulated a rationale to
curtail the sovereignty of Indian nations, the status of Indians, in the minds
of some, was degraded further by the adoption of the term "tribe" when
referring to Indians." As one commentator stated - the use of the words
"tribe" or "tribal" might inappropriately denote a "less advanced" culture.
5 2
Nevertheless, the framers of the American Constitution adopted this term
leading to its ultimate use in the many statutes and judicial cases concerning
Indian settlements.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1500 (asserting that Marshall's assignment of the term "domestic dependent
nations" forever "de-internationalized" or "domesticized" tribal status).
47. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832).
48. Fredericks, supra note 14, at 365.
49. Id.; COHEN, supra note 16, at 234; O'Brien, supra note 22, at 1464.
50. Fredericks, supra note 14, at 365; KERmIT HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
260 (1996).
51. John Randolph Prince, Indian Country: A Different Model of Sovereignty, 33 GoNz.
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Despite multiple constitutional attacks alleging that the term is
discriminatory or an improper racial classification under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court validated the use
of the term. The Court affirmed the use of the word determining that the
term is a "political classification" rather than a racial one.3 Today, the term
is a universally adopted classification and even a desired status or form of
recognition for organized groups of Indians seeking federally created
benefits.'
In negotiations, the federal government chose to assign the term "tribe"
to Indian groups." Perhaps, the federal government, including the courts
and Congress, failed to employ a precise or blanket definition of the term
in order to arrive at a desired result.' It has even been stated that no
universal, legal definition of the term exists because no specific, fitting, or
all-inclusive standard could be articulated to cover the vast array of Indian
groups deserving or seeking recognition."
In any event, the term - Indian tribe - is commonly used in two
manners - an ethnological sense and also a legal-political sense. " The
ethnological sense addresses the origin, characteristics, vernacular, and
ancestry of certain Indian tribes. This sense is commonly assessed and
analyzed by reference to geographic boundaries and ethnic or personal
character traits. The political sense addresses the classification and
organization of tribes for political, legislative, or administrative purposes as
well as federal assistance and benefits."9
The broad and multiple definitions of the term "tribe" allowed the federal
government to diminish the rights of Indians and actually deny them
particular rights depending on the context and reach of particular statutes
utilizing the term.' The need for a definition of the term "tribe" originated
in order to settle treaty disputes and is presently utilized to determine
eligibility for federal support, protection, and assistance.6' In fact, pursuant
to the Code of Federal Regulations, formal acknowledgment of tribal
existence by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is a prerequisite to the
53. L.R. Weatherhead, What Is an "Indian Tribe"? - The Question of Tribal Existence,
8 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 3 (1980).
54. Rachael Paschal, The Imprimatur of Recognition: American Indian Tribes and the
Federal Acknowledgment Process, 66 WASH. L. REV. 209, 211 (1991).
55. Gunter, supra note 17, at 93.
56. Id.
57. COHEN, supra note 16, at 3; see also Weatherhead, supra note 53, at 5.
58. COHEN, supra note 16, at 3.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id. at 3.
61. Id.
rNo. 11
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protection, services, immunities, privileges, and benefits provided by the
federal government by virtue of their status as "tribes."2
In recognition of the fact that the definition of the term "tribe" was open
for judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court developed a widely used
definition of its own in Montoya v. United States and reaffirmed in United
States v. Calendaria3 For example, the Court defined a "tribe" as "a body
of Indians of the same or similar race, united in a community under one
leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular, though sometimes ill-
defined territory."" Despite the differing definitions attributed to tribes in
common law doctrines and judicial case holdings, tribes have gained formal
recognition from the legislative and executive branches of the federal
government.
B. Recognition by the Federal Legislative and Executive Branches
1. Recognition of Indian Tribes by the Legislative Branch
Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the authority to regulate
Indian tribes. The determination that Indians residing together validly
constitute a tribe rests with Congress and not the courts.' Congress has
delegated regulation over tribes - although some consider the duty a
nondelegable, constitutionally empowered responsibility - to the executive
branch (i.e., the BIA).
The definition previously established in Montoya v. United States, is
presently utilized as part of a multifactor test in determining the legitimacy
or the existence of a tribe. In the event the federal government determines
that a tribe exists, courts generally accept such recognized status without
question. "Arbitrariness" represents the only constitutional barrier that
prohibits a blanket definition of an "Indian tribe" from being applied to all
federal, Indian legislation." Congress, however, routinely delegates the
62. 5 C.F.R. § 83.2 (2002).
63. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901); United States v. Calendaria,
271 U.S. 432, 442 (1926).
64. Id.; see also Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 427 F. Supp. 899,902 (D. Mass.
1977) (noting the power and competence of the court to recognize the actual existence of a
tribe even though it is not otherwise formally recognized); Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury
Corp., 592 F.2d 575, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979) (stating that the phrase "Indian tribe"
is to be construed liberally in an Indian tribes favor when ascertaining the existence or
qualifications regarding a given tribe's eligibility for federal benefits due to the wide
variations and conditions confronting tribes in diverse geographic areas).
65. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 49 (1913); Candelaria, 271 U.S. at 439.
66. 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
67. COHEN, supra note 16, at 3; see also United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 650
(1978); Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977).
68. Weatherhead, supra note 53, at 4-8; see Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46 (stating that
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defining responsibility to the administrative agencies of the executive branch
(i.e., the BIA), unless Congress expressly defines the term in a particular
statute.' Because Congress can overrule a BIA decision (or for that matter
a judicial decision) by legislative act, the power Congress wields over Indian
affairs must also be considered.
To further confuse the situation, in the event a petitioning group of
Indians are not formally recognized by the BIA as a tribe, they may attain
formal recognition by fitting within the expressed criteria or definition in a
particular statute. Tribes may exist for one purpose or statute but fail to
exist for others.7 '' Therefore, tribal status must be considered and analyzed
as applied in a particular statute or situation.7' Prime examples and
differentiation in federal statutes are:
a) Title 20 of the United States Code - Education - American
Indian, Alaska Native, and Native Hawaiian Culture and Art Develop-
ment
Title 20 U.S.C. § 4402(4) and (5) ("Definitions"):
(4) The term "Indian" means any person who is a member of
an Indian tribe.
(5) The term "Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, nation, or
other organized group or community of Indians, including any
Alaska Native village (as defined in or established pursuant to the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act), which is recognized as
eligible for special programs and services provided by the United
States to Indians because of their status as Indians ... 
b) Title 25 of the United States Code - Indians
Title 25 U.S.C. § 479 ("Definitions"):
The term "Indian" as used in this Act shall include all persons
of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian
tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are
descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934,
residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation,
and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more
Congress is not empowered to arbitrarily bring a group of people together by calling them
a tribe).
69. Weatherhead, supra note 53, at 5.
70. COHEN, supra note 16, at 7.
71. Id.
72. 20 U.S.C. § 4402(4)-(5) (2000).
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Indian blood. For the purposes of this Act, Eskimos and other
aboriginal peoples of Alaska shall be considered Indians. The
term "tribe" wherever used in this Act shall be construed to refer
to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians
residing on one reservation."
Title 25 U.S.C. § 479a(2): "The term 'Indian Tribe' means any Indian or
Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or community that the
Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe."74
Title 25 U.S.C. § 472a(e)(l):
(1) The term "tribal organization" means
(A) the recognized governing body of any Indian tribe, band,
nation, pueblo, or other organized community, including a Native
Village ... ; or
(B) in connection with any personnel action referred to in
subsection (c)(l) of this section, any legally established or-
ganization of Indians which is controlled, sanctioned, or chartered
by a governing body referred to in subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph ....
Title 25 U.S.C. § 450b(d) and (e), the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975, provides:
(d) "Indian" means a person who is a member of an Indian
tribe;
(e) "Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other
organized group or community, including any Alaska Native
village or regional or village corporation as defined in or es-
tablished pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act...
which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and
services provided by the United States to Indians because of their
status as Indians .. 7
Title 25 U.S.C. § 1301(l), from the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
("Constitutional Rights of Indians Generally"): "(1) 'Indian tribe' means any
tribe, band, or other group of Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and recognized as possessing powers of self-government. ..
73. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2000).
74. 25 U.S.C. § 479a(2) (2000).
75. 25 U.S.C. § 472a(e)(1) (2000).
76. 25 U.S.C. § 450b(d)-(e) (2000).
77. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(l) (2000).
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Title 25 U.S.C. § 1603(d), from the Indian Health Care Act:
"Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, nation, or other organized
group or community, including any Alaska Native village... as
defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, which is recognized as eligible for the special
programs and services provided by the United States to Indians
because of their status as Indians . .. ."
Title 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8), of the Indian Child Welfare Act: "'Indian tribe'
means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or com-
munity of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians
by the Secretary because of their status as Indians, including any Alaska
Native Village. .. ."
Title 25 U.S.C. § 2403(3), of the Alcohol and Substance Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act:
The term "Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation,
or other organized group or community of Indians (including any
Alaska Native village.., as defined in, or established pursuant to,
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act), which is recognized as
eligible for special programs and services provided by the United
States to Indians because of their status as Indians .... 8"
Title 25 U.S.C. § 479, of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (section
19 of the IRA): Congress announced prospectively which Indian groups
would be recognized as Indian tribes for purposes of the act by authorizing
three types of groups as follows: "A. Members of any recognized Indian
tribe now under federal jurisdiction; B. Descendants of members of such
recognized Indian tribe, who resided on any reservation on June 1, 1934; C.
Person of one half or more Indian Blood.""A
c) Title 42 of the United States Code - The Public Health & Welfare
42 U.S.C. § 9601(36): "The term 'Indian Tribe' means any Indian tribe,
band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska
native village, . . . which is recognized as eligible for the special programs
and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status
as Indians . ..."'
78. 25 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2000).
79. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (2000).
80. 25 U.S.C. § 2403(3) (2000).
81. Weatherhead, supra note 53, at 12; see 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2000).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(36) (2000).
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42 U.S.C. § 300f(14): "The term 'Indian Tribe' means any Indian tribe
having a Federally recognized governing body carrying out substantial
governmental duties and powers over any area."83
d) 40 C.F.R. § 146.3 - Public Buildings, Property, and Works
"Indian Tribe means any Indian Tribe having a Federally recognized
governing body carrying out substantial governmental duties and powers
over a defined area.""
In addition to the definitions proscribed in the statutes, a federal
acknowledgment or recognition process exists. The process has a distinct
history worthy of a substantive discussion concerning its inception and
current framework.
2. Recognition of Indian Tribes by the Executive Branch
The importance assigned to Indian relations as well as tribal recognition
by the federal government is manifested by the fact that four of the first
thirteen statutes passed by the first Congress of the United States addressed
Indian affairs.8 In the Act of August 7, 1789, Congress established the
Department of War and commissioned this Department to follow the
directions of the President in regard to Indian affairs as well as military
matters." Subsequently, the BIA was established in 1832 as part of the
Department of War; however, in 1849, the primary responsibility for the
administration of Indian affairs was transferred to another executive branch
department - the Department of the Interior."'
Today, the BIA functions as part of the Department of Interior under the
executive branch and performs a majority of the federal responsibilities
regarding Indian affairs." In particular, the BIA, under the direction of the
Interior Department's Assistant Secretary of Indian affairs, is solely
responsible for administering the federal acknowledgment process of
unrecognized tribes.8
83. 42 U.S.C. § 300f(14) (2000).
84. 40 C.F.R. § 146.3 (2001).
85. COHEN, supra note 16, at 108 n.378.
86. Id. at 108; Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49.
87. COHEN, supra note 16, at 673.
88. Id.; see 25 U.S.C. §§ 1-17 (2000) ("Bureau of Indian Affairs"); see 25 U.S.C. § la
(2000) (authorizing the Secretary of Interior to expressly delegate powers and duties of Indian
affairs to the Commission of Indian Affairs); see William Claiborne, Tribes and Tribulations:
BIA Seeks to Lose a Duty; Indians' Casino Rush Overwhelms Agency's Recognition Staff,
WASH. POST, June 2, 2000, at A31 (noting that the BIA is currently overwhelmed by the
massive recognition issues relating to Indians).
89. Paschal, supra note 54, at 209.
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Despite broad federal authority empowering administrative agencies with
the duty of recognizing tribal status, Indian tribes are recognized utilizing
a number of methods and diverse criteria. Recognition by treaty,9'
agreement,9 ' executive order,' legislation, continuous course of dealings
with the federal govemment,9 or a continuous political relationship with
the federal government" (i.e., administrative actions such as providing
services to tribes through the Department of the Interior/BIA) are all
possible ways tribes are recognized." In 1978, the BIA, on its own
initiative and not at the behest of the Congress, formally established an
administrative program to facilitate the tribal recognition process by
providing a systematic and specifically defined process of attaining tribal
recognition.96
The federal acknowledgment process promulgated by the BIA requires
petitioning tribes to satisfy a meticulous seven-part test. ' The process
requires representatives of a tribe to file a detailed petition with the BIA
providing evidence that the particular tribe meets each element of a seven-
part test establishing each of the following:"
(1) "The petitioner has been identified as an American Indian entity on
a substantially continuous basis since 1900."99
(2) "A predominant portion of the petitioning group comprises a distinct
community and has existed as a community from historical times until
present.""°
90. See, e.g., Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, U.S.-Nisqually et al., 10 Stat.
1132 (1855) (establishing a reservation); Weatherhead, supra note 53, at 8.
91. See, e.g., Act of July 1, 1892, ch. 140, 27 Stat. 62 (ratifying an agreement with the
Colville Tribe).
92. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-98 (1963). In 1919 Congress
terminated the practice of creating reservations by executive order. 43 U.S.C. § 150 (2000).
93. See Paschal, supra note 54, at 210 (citing an example regarding official recognition
of an Indian tribe where a trust relationship existed between the Indian tribe and the federal
government consisting of continuous federal contact, negotiations, and exchange of federally
conferred benefits); see also COHEN, supra note 16, at 6.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913); Weatherhead, supra
note 53, at 15.
95. Weatherhead, supra note 53, at 8. See generally Paschal, supra note 54.
96. Gunter, supra note 17, at 95.
97. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a)-(g) (2000).
98. Id.; Paschal, supra note 54, at 216.
99. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a) (2000).
100. Id. § 83.7(b).
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(3) "The petitioner has maintained political influence or authority over its
members as an autonomous entity from historical times until the
present."'°'
(4) "A copy of the group's present governing document including its
membership criteria. In the absence of a written document, the petitioner
must provide a statement describing in full its membership criteria and
current governing procedures." 'ij
(5) "The petitioner's membership consists of individuals who descend
from a historical Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes which
combined and functioned as a single autonomous political entity."1'
3
(6) "The membership of the petitioning group is composed principally of




(7) "Neither the petitioner nor its members are the subject of congres-
sional legislation that has expressly terminated or forbidden the Federal
relationship. '""
Once the petition containing proof of the seven necessary elements is
filed, the BIA appoints a staff of historians, anthropologists, and
genealogists to evaluate the merits of the tribe's petition." The twelve
members serving on the BIA's Branch of Acknowledgment and Research
staff also verify and research the merits of the petition followed by BIA
experts who summarize their reports and issue proposed findings.""
Finally, after a notice and comment period, the Assistant Secretary of Indian
Affairs authorizes and issues a final determination." Of course, the
process is lengthy, costly, and dilatory, often costing a petitioning entity as
much as $400,000 to $1 million and lasting as long as twenty-five years."'
While the term "Indian tribe" is a clearly desirable designation for organized
tribes, its definition is less than clear and subject to substantial ad-
ministrative costs and financial burdens. Considering such costs, one may
question why a tribe seeks federal recognition.
101. Id. § 83.7(c).
102. Id. § 83.7(d).
103. Id. § 83.7(e).
104. Id. § 83.7(0.
105. Id. § 83.7(g).
106. Paschal, supra note 54, at 216.
107. Id. at 217; Claiborne, supra note 88, at A31.
108. Paschal, supra note 54, at 217.
109. Id. at 219; see Claiborne, supra note 88, at A31 (providing updated numbers and
statistics regarding the recognition process).
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C. Why Indian Tribes Seek Federal Recognition
Official federal recognition as a tribe qualifies such entities for a
multitude of rights and benefits as expressly stated in 25 C.F.R. § 83.2.""
Federal assistance and benefits, status as a sovereign entity, tax exemptions,
and the establishment of a trust relationship as the beneficiary of a high
fiduciary duty, represent the reasons why tribes expend enormous time and
resources to attain formal recognition."'
Federal recognition automatically qualifies tribes as eligible for multiple
forms of federal assistance programs."' Services such as financial assis-
tance and social services,"' loans to tribal members,"4  housing
improvement programs,"5 and health services"' are just a few of the
many services and benefits provided to qualified, eligible Indian tribes."
7
As a sovereign entity, officially recognized tribes are allowed to self
govern and enjoy immunity from state taxation and regulations within tribal
territory. Recognition as a tribe is also a prerequisite to being exempt from
state laws or state constitutional provisions prohibiting casino gambling.""
In a similar fashion, tribal sovereignty bears significant value in regard to
tribal exemptions from state and federal taxes."
For example, tribes expend enormous resources maintaining the state and
federal tax exemptions on gaming revenues earned in tribal casinos.""
Tribes, like the Mississippi Choctaw, also attract corporate giants like Ford
Motor Co. and AT&T, who build manufacturing plants within tribal territory
in order to reap the lower corporate tax rates on these sovereign, tribal
lands.'2 ' The enormous entrepreneurial and corporate growth, however, are
110. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2 (2000).
111. Paschal, supra note 54, at 209.
112. Id. at 213.
113. 25 C.F.R. § 20.100 (2000).
114. 25 C.F.R. § 101 (2000).
115. 25 C.F.R. § 256.1 (2000).
116. 42 C.F.R. § 36.2 (2000).
117. See generally Paschal, supra note 54, at 228 nn.39-41; Rebecca Tsosie, American
Indians and The Politics of Recognition: Soifer on Law, Pluralism, and Group Identity, 22
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 359, 362 (1997) (referring to special programs such as the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963; Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013; Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a-450n).
118. Claiborne, supra note 88, at A31.
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dependent upon the trust relationship existing between the federal
government and tribes.
Currently, some 558 Indian tribes are formally recognized under federal
law."22 As a growing number of tribes participate in substantial commercial
activities such as resort management, casino gambling, manufacturing,
banking, and agribusinesses, tribes represent a distinct political, commercial,
and economic entity.'" In fact, the commercial success of Indian tribes has
led to as many as ten banks established and run by Native Americans.
Moreover, the president of the North American Native Bankers Association
of Norman, Oklahoma expects Indian tribes to own or control as many as
fifty or sixty banks by 2010.24 These Indian tribes engaging in commercial
activities are not immune from economic or financial troubles or downturns.
Close scrutiny of the status of tribes may be required in the event a tribe
or tribally owned entity, seeks relief under the Bankruptcy Code as a debtor
attempting business reorganization or as a creditor in a case or proceeding
under the Code. After an appreciation and brief understanding of the history
and status of Indian tribes in American law, an overview of the Bankruptcy
Code is helpful before analyzing the subjects concurrently.
IlI. Brief Overview of Bankruptcy Code and Its Accompanying
Jurisdictional and Venue Provisions
In the event an Indian tribe participates as a debtor or creditor in a
bankruptcy case or proceeding, the following sections of this article
provide some basic principles and explanations regarding the vernacular,
jurisdiction, venue, and substantive provisions governing the bankruptcy
courts and the applicable rules of procedure in bankruptcy.
A. An Overview of the Purposes and Policies Underlying the
Bankruptcy Code
Like every other citizen in America, individual Indians and Indian tribes
have absolute and equal rights under the law. Today, tribes participate in
commercially diverse and complex business enterprises. There is a
reasonable likelihood that one or more tribes will encounter economic
122. Claiborne, supra note 88, at A31.
123. Id. (providing updated numbers and statistics regarding the recognition process);
Fredericks, supra note 14, at 349; Booth, supra note 7, at Al (reporting that each of the 107
federally recognized tribes in California have the right to open two casinos each and many
currently planned include elaborate spas, luxury suites, golf courses, cultural centers, and
hiking trails); Doyle, supra note 7, at B1.
124. Pamela Sebastian Ridge, Native Americans Move into the Banking Business as
Their Assets Grow, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2000, at Al.
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problems similar to some other commercial enterprises and entities. By
understanding the basic purposes and policies underlying the federal
bankruptcy laws, tribes can informatively and efficiently participate in the
nation's bankruptcy courts.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the purposes of the federal
bankruptcy laws on numerous occasions. For example, in Stellwagen v.
Clum,'" the Court stated:
The federal system of bankruptcy is designed not only to
distribute the property of the debtor, not by law exempted,
fairly and equally among his creditors, but as a main purpose
of the act, intends to aid the unfortunate debtor by giving him
a fresh start in life, free from debts, except of a certain charac-
ter, after the property which he owned at the time of bankruptcy
has been administered for the benefit of creditors. Our decisions
lay great stress upon this feature of the law as one not only of
private but of great public interest in that it secures to the
unfortunate debtor, who surrenders his property for distribution,
a new opportunity in life. 2
Moreover, the federal bankruptcy laws are full of social and economic
concerns that serve the public interest. One purpose, and the general
philosophy of the bankruptcy laws, is "to give the [honest but unfortunate]
debtor a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, un-
hampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt."'2 7
The other, countervailing purpose of the bankruptcy laws is to promote
equality of treatment among similarly situated creditors. In essence, the
bankruptcy laws displace the various state debt collection processes in
favor of a uniform collective process in the federal bankruptcy court.
America's bankruptcy laws are characterized by, inter alia, inherent
tension among divergent interests. In a bankruptcy case, there are many
competing and countervailing interests to consider including, for example,
the interests of a tribe in a given case. It has been said that bankruptcy is
a distinct system of jurisprudence - the nature of which is to sort out all
of the debtor's legal relationships with others, and to apply the uniform
substantive principles and procedural rules of the bankruptcy laws to those
125. 245 U.S. 605 (1918).
126. Id. at 617; see Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877); Traer v. Clews, 115 U.S.
528, 541 (1885); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902); Wetmoer v.
Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904); Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913).
127. Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
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relationships. The goal being to either financially rehabilitate a distressed
debtor or assemble and liquidate a debtor's assets for an equitable
distribution to creditors. To accomplish these goals, modifications of pre-
bankruptcy debtor-creditor relationships are required. As a result, a claim
in bankruptcy may be satisfied in a manner far different from that
originally contemplated by the parties.
Accordingly, pre-existing legal relationships can be disturbed from a
broad perspective by the bankruptcy laws, subject to many statutory
safeguards. A bankruptcy discharge is a privilege and not a constitutional
right, and only honest debtors receive bankruptcy discharges. 2 ' For
example, § 727(a) of the Code sets forth the statutory grounds for denial
of an individual debtor's general discharge in a chapter 7 liquidation case.
Notwithstanding an honest individual debtor's general discharge, as a
matter of legislative and social policy, certain debts of individual debtors
are not subject to a discharge by virtue of § 523(a) of the Code.'29
For example, Congress legislated that the following debts are not
subject to discharge: taxes, debts obtained by fraud, unscheduled debts,
embezzlement, alimony and child support, willful and malicious injury,
fines and penalties owed to the government, student loans, previously
scheduled debts that were judicially declared nondischargeable, and debts
arising from motor vehicle accidents when operating the vehicle while im-
paired.'" These exceptions insure that America's bankruptcy laws are
utilized for one of its intended purposes - to provide the honest and
unfortunate debtor a fresh start.
B. An Overview of the Bankruptcy Code and Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure
From a broad perspective, the Code is intended to fairly and equitably
balance the rights of creditors and debtors. The laws of Congress relating
to bankruptcy are designed to rehabilitate financially distressed debtors or
provide parties with a forum for assembly and liquidation of a debtor's
non-exempt assets, if any, for an equitable distribution to creditors under
a statutory scheme of distribution. While the Code provides the substan-
tive bankruptcy laws, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provide
the procedures to implement such laws. 3'
128. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Hunt, 292 U.S. at 244.
129. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2000); 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2000) (regarding bankruptcy
discharge). Compare with 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (2000) (regarding discharges in chapter 11
reorganization cases filed by corporations, partnerships, and individuals).
130. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000).
131. Some procedure is legislated in the statutory provisions of the Code. See also Hon.
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The Code is divided into eight chapters. Chapters 1, 3, and 5 of the
Code, with limited exceptions, are the general provisions applicable to all
the operative chapters under the Code (i.e., chapters 7, 9, 11, [12],"3" and
13). Chapter 1 of the Code addresses general matters such as definitions,
rules of construction, and eligibility to be a debtor under the Code.
Chapter 3 outlines the administration of estates, providing guidance
concerning use of the debtor's assets and other provisions necessary for the
management of the debtor's estate. In the event the requisite number of
creditors file an involuntary petition against a debtor under either chapter
7 or I1, chapter 3 (specifically § 303 of the Code) contains statutory
provisions regarding involuntary bankruptcy cases. 33 Chapter 3 also
addresses matters concerning the automatic stay; the use, sale and lease of
property; and executory contracts and unexpired leases. Chapter 5 defines
the rights of creditors, debtors, bankruptcy trustees, and the substantive
rights of debtors regarding estate property.
All of these sections concurrently govern and guide utilization of the
bankruptcy laws. For example, the automatic stay provisions in § 362(a)
of the Code automatically apply to any "entity," as defined in § 101, upon
the debtor's mere filing of a petition under §§ 301, 302, or 303 of the
Code." This example serves as just one instance where the chapters of
the Code work concurrently to resolve insolvency disputes and curtail
aggressive collection tactics by virtue of one of the Code's equitable
powers - the automatic stay.'35
Chapters 7, 9, 11, [12], and 13, often referred to as the operative
chapters, generally apply in their respective chapters with some limited
exceptions. Chapter 7 of the Code, styled "Liquidation," is designed for
insolvent individuals seeking a fresh financial start as well as corporate or
partnership businesses desiring to cease conducting business and liquidate
David S. Kennedy et al., The Involuntary Bankruptcy Process: A Study of the Relevant
Statutory and Procedural Provisions and Related Matters, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. I (2000).
132. The current status and future of chapter 12 is in doubt. See infra note 140 for an
explanation of the current status of this chapter of the Code.
133. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
134. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 362.0311 (15th ed. 2002) [hereinafter COLLIER].
135. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6296-97;
S. REP. No. 95-989, at 54-55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5840-51 ("The
automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws.
It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all
harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or
reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into
bankruptcy.").
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in an orderly manner. Petitions under chapter 7 may be filed voluntarily
by debtors or involuntarily by creditors.
Insolvent municipalities and other local government units are specially
treated under the Code and file petitions under chapter 9." Only
voluntary petitions initiate a case under chapter 9; no involuntary petition
may be filed. In order to qualify as an eligible municipality, all of the
elements in § 109(c) must be met. '37
Chapter 1 1 allows a corporation or partnership business, individual
proprietor, or consumer debtor an opportunity to reorganize or be
liquidated. Upon filing the chapter 11 petition, debtors enjoy a "breathing
spell" which allows debtors time to restructure their assets and liabilities
in a formally presented reorganization plan. Chapter II of the Code
provides financially distressed businesses an opportunity to restructure
their finances which ordinarily serves the best long-term interest of
creditors and shareholders." It is also said that chapter 11 allows
businesses time to avoid the auctioneer's hammer by better serving the
economy by preserving jobs.'
Initially, Congress enacted chapter 12 to meet the special needs of
financially distressed "family farmers."'" Finally, chapter 13 provides
financial relief for eligible individuals with regular income desiring to
restructure their finances over a period of three to five years. With an
understanding of the basic purposes and policies of the Code and its
tenets, an explanation of the jurisdictional provisions and court structure
is helpful.
136. See Jack L. Smith, Chapter 9 Bankruptcy - A Primer for a Developing Remedy,
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Feb. 1991, at 2; Avoiding the Hit and Run Chapter 9, 28
Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP), News and Comment, No. 24, at AI (May 21, 1996).
137. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2000).
138. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6179-80
(discussing the purposes of business reorganization).
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)-(19) (2000); id. § 109(0. Pending bankruptcy
legislation - House Bill 333 and Senate Bill 420 - contain provisions making chapter 12
a permanent part of the Bankruptcy Code and retroactively enacted to vitiate the void
incurred upon its June 30, 2000, expiration. However, on May 11, 2001, President Bush
signed House Bill 256 (Family Farmer Bankruptcy Provisions Extension, Pub. L. No. 107-8,
115 Stat. 10 (2000)) extending the availability of chapter 12 until June 1, 2001. Chapter 12
received yet another temporary six-month extension on December 19, 2002, when President
Bush signed House Bill 5472 that re-enacted chapter 12 of the Code from January I, 2003,
until July 1, 2003.
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C. Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Generally
Indian tribes, like many others who may be unfamiliar with the current
governing jurisdictional provisions and substantive bankruptcy laws and
rules, may have questions regarding the jurisdictional provisions governing
the federal bankruptcy court. An understanding of the statutory relation-
ship between the United States district court and the United States
bankruptcy court and the semantics utilized in the relevant statutes is
critical in addressing, for example, the bankruptcy court's source of
authority; the role and authority of a bankruptcy judge; the distinction
between bankruptcy "cases" and "proceedings"; and the distinction
between "core" and "non-core" proceedings under the Code.
1. Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b)
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1334 confers original jurisdiction of bankruptcy
"cases" and "proceedings" on the United States district courts. The terms
bankruptcy "case" and "proceeding" are terms of art and should not be
used interchangeably.'" Title 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) provides that the
United States district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
of all bankruptcy cases filed under chapters 7, 9, 11, [121, and 13 of the
Code. Thus, all bankruptcy cases are filed in the federal court system and
not in the state court system.
The bankruptcy "case" is broadly described to include all events in the
case (from its beginning to its conclusion) or "the whole ball of wax" that
is created upon the filing of the bankruptcy "petition" under § 101(42) of
the Code.4 2 "Proceedings" as contemplated under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b),
are specific "subactions" or specific lawsuits within a bankruptcy "case"
and are commenced by the filing of, for example, a complaint, motion,
notice, an objection, or an application.1
3
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) recognizes the permissive and mandatory
abstention doctrines which provide that the district court has non-exclusive
jurisdiction (i.e., concurrent jurisdiction) over all civil proceedings arising
under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11. The effect of
the abstention doctrine under § 1334(c) allows the district court (usually
the bankruptcy court) to defer to state courts certain proceedings arising
141. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2000) ("cases"); id. § 1334(b) ("civil proceedings").
142. See, e.g., In re Blevins Elec., Inc., 185 B.R. 250, 253 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995);
In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assoc., L.P., 157 B.R. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing 5 COLLIER, supra
note 134, § 1109.02).
143. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7003 (incorporating FED. R. CIV. P. 3); 2 COLLIER, supra
note 134, § 301.03.
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under the'Code or arising in or related to cases under the Code (i.e.,
lawsuits that involve strictly state law and state law issues).
2. Designation of Bankruptcy Courts and Appointment and Reap-
pointment of Bankruptcy Judges Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-152
Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 151 and 152 describe the authority and appointment
(and reappointment) process for United States bankruptcy judges in each
judicial district. Bankruptcy judges are not empowered or created under
Article III of the United States Constitution. The empowerment and
authority of a bankruptcy judge to adjudicate cases or proceedings under
title 11 of the United States Code must originate from a federal statute.
This authority is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 151, establishing bankruptcy
judges as judicial officers of the district court empowered with the authority
to preside over most cases, actions, lawsuits, or proceedings that are referred
to them by the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).'" But, under 28
U.S.C. § 151, bankruptcy judges in each judicial district constitute a unit of
the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court for that district and
are appointed (and may be reappointed) by the respective United States
court of appeals for fourteen-year, fixed terms under 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1)
removable only for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical
or mental disability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 152(e)."5
3. Reference and Withdrawal of the Reference Under 28 U.S.C. §§
157(a) and (d)
Title 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) provides the statutory authority for district court
referral of any or all bankruptcy cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy
court. Pragmatically, every bankruptcy case or proceeding is automatically
referred to the bankruptcy court in the district, as all the district courts have
entered broad standing automatic orders of reference. Upon the district
court's referral of bankruptcy cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy court
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), the bankruptcy court, rather than the district court,
thereafter exercises original bankruptcy jurisdiction rather than the district
court. The district court, for cause shown, may later withdraw, in whole or
in part, any case or proceeding and in some limited proceedings must
withdraw the reference of a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).
4. Core and Non-Core Proceedings Under 28 U.S. C. § 157(b)-(c)
Title 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)-(c) statutorily distinguishes between "core"
proceedings on the one hand and "non-core" proceedings on the other. The
144. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2000); see also id. § 152.
145. Id. § 151.
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"core" and "non-core" dichotomy may generate possible confusion for those
unfamiliar with the bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions. The necessity to
prescribe bankruptcy judges' jurisdiction through the use of the core and
non-core dichotomy arose after the Supreme Court issued its plurality
opinion declaring a portion of the prior bankruptcy jurisdictional scheme
unconstitutional. '"
Congress responded in 1984 and restructured the bankruptcy court's
jurisdictional structure by passing the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 (the 1984 Amendments). 4" In the 1984
Amendments, Congress created the core and non-core distinction found in
28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(1)-(2) and (c)(l)-(2)."4 This distinction is particularly
important because it separates the proceedings in which non-Article III,
bankruptcy judges may properly exercise powers to hear and determine
certain legal disputes. In "core" proceedings, the powers of bankruptcy
judges are broad; however, in "non-core" proceedings, absent consent of the
parties, the powers are more limited.
Bankruptcy judges under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) may both hear and
determine all cases referred under title 11 and all referred core proceedings
arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11, and may enter
appropriate orders, subject only to traditional appellate review - on a
clearly erroneous standard - by the district court or in some judicial
districts the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (sometimes referred to as a
BAP). 9 Title 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) contains a non-exclusive laundry list
of "core" proceedings that classify the vast majority of the types of
proceedings before the bankruptcy courts."
146. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
147. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 101,98 Stat. 333,333 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1334(2000)).
148. id.
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (2000) (allowing the judicial council of the circuit to
allow all appeals to be heard by a group of bankruptcy judges serving on a bankruptcy
appellate panel).
150. Id. § 157(b)(2). The statute states:
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to -
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions
from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the
purposes of confirming a plan under chapter II, 12, or 13 of title 1 but not the
liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or
wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case
under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the
estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
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The 1984 jurisdictional amendments do not define or even attempt to list
or illustrate "non-core" proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c). It is said that
"non-core" proceedings are related proceedings such as, for example, a
lawsuit involving state law and issues commenced or prosecuted by a
bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession, which is based on a
breach of contract, warranty, or other state law claim.'' A non-core
proceeding may also involve a suit that involves all of the following: (1) a
state law cause of action; (2) against a defendant that was not a creditor of
the estate (or at least did not assert a claim against the estate); and (3) a
nonbankruptcy, congressional statute.
Pursuant to their powers under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3), bankruptcy judges
may initially determine whether a given proceeding is core or non-core. It
is noted that a bankruptcy judge's determination that a proceeding is core or
non-core shall not be made solely on the basis that its resolution may be
affected by state law and may be appealed.'52 Determinations regarding
whether a matter is core or non-core requires careful consideration of the
factors in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
Bankruptcy judges issue final orders in "core" proceedings which are
subject to appeal to the district court in the judicial district where the
bankruptcy judge is serving or, in some districts, a Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel.' In a "non-core" proceeding, a bankruptcy judge, nonetheless, may
hear the proceeding and thereafter submit proposed findings of fact and
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash
collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from
claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against
the estate; and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or
the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship,
except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
Id.
151. See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Robinson Indus., Inc., 46 B.R. 464 (D. Mass.
1985).
152. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3) (2000).
153. Id. § 158(a); see also id. § 158(b)(1).
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conclusions of law to the federal district court for a de novo review pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9033.
After considering the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings and conclusions
of law on a de novo review basis, the district judge enters a final order in
a non-core proceeding. By virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2), a bankruptcy
judge may enter a final order in a "non-core" proceeding with the consent
of all the parties to the non-core proceeding, subject only to the traditional
appellate review on a clearly erroneous standard by the district court (or, if
appropriate, by a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel).' 4
5. Application of Jurisdictional Provisions to Indian Tribes
Two decisions prior to the 1984 amendments accompanying the Code
addressed the question regarding the jurisdiction of bankruptcy cases
involving Indian tribes.' 5 The current jurisdictional provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1334 are quite similar to the former bifurcated jurisdictional
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, despite the 1984 amendments." 6
It appears that the first time a bankruptcy court actually addressed the issue
of tribes in a reported case was 1981.'
The Sandmar court directly addressed whether a bankruptcy court had
jurisdiction over a tribe in its capacity as a creditor.' 8 Factually, the case
involved a tribe that knowingly violated the automatic stay provisions of §
362(a) of the Code and repossessed a leasehold after a non-Indian, tenant-
debtor under the Code defaulted on a lease.59 The court stated that the
case was one of first impression for the court while expressly recognizing
counsel's inability to cite any cases discussing Indian tribes and
bankruptcy."' In concluding that the bankruptcy court was the only forum
for resolution of the dispute between the tribe and the debtor-citizen under
the Code, the court noted the broad jurisdictional grant of bankruptcy courts
in 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) - codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) - and the
authority of Congress to establish uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies in the Constitution.'6' Furthermore, the court stated that
allowing the bankruptcy court to hear and determine the dispute involving
154. The Supreme Court approved a similar delegation of authority under the Magistrate
Judges Act as not violative of Article III in United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
155. in re Sandmar, 12 B.R. 910 (D.N.M. 1981); In re Shape, 25 B.R. 356 (D. Mont.
1982).
156. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000); id. § 1441.
157. See Sandmar, 12 B.R. 910.
158. Id. at 912-13.
159. Id. at 911-12.
160. Id. at 913, 915.
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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the debtor and the tribe allowed a specialized tribunal to administer a
comprehensive body of uniform federal bankruptcy law and practice without
infringing upon the jurisdiction of the tribal courts.'"
The Sandmar court's analysis focused on the jurisdictional grant in 28
U.S.C. § 1471(e), currently 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e), granting the bankruptcy
court exclusive jurisdiction over all the property, wherever located, of the
debtor, as of the commencement of such case.'63 The court refused to
accept the argument that each tribe could enact separate bankruptcy laws on
reservations, holding that upon violating the automatic stay and pursuing its
claim in bankruptcy court, the tribe subjected itself to the court's jurisdic-
tion.'" The Sandmar court's jurisdictional analysis was utilized a year later
in a similar case involving a dispute between a tribe and a non-Indian debtor
under the Code.
Similarly, the court in In re Shape determined that the bankruptcy court
had personal and subject matter jurisdiction over tribes and tribal trust lands
involved in a bankruptcy case by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e).' The
court relied on the broad statutory grant of jurisdiction conferred upon the
bankruptcy court by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (currently contained
in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)). As long as the tribe's sovereign immunity did not
preclude the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction; the court could decide the
case. "' Quoting and relying on the Sandmar case extensively, the Shape
court held that it had jurisdiction despite the tribes sovereign status for the
same reasons.'" The court additionally noted an "implicit divestiture" of
sovereignty surrendered by tribes dating back to the ratification of the
Constitution.'" Recognizing a limitation on tribal sovereignty and utilizing
language supporting the bankruptcy court's exercise of jurisdiction, the court
quoted from Sandmar, stating that "the areas in which such implicit
divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving
the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe."'
'1
162. Sandmar, 12 B.R. at 915.
163. The former jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) now appears in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(e), granting the district court, who automatically refers the case to the bankruptcy
court pursuant to the reference provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 157, jurisdiction over all the
debtor's property, wherever located, in a case under this title.
164. Sandmnar, 12 B.R. at 916.
165. In re Shape, 25 B.R. 356 (D. Mont. 1982).
166. Id. at 358.
167. Id. at 359 (noting that due to the broad scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e), U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 8, cl. 4, and the fact that tribes are subject to the automatic stay as both an entity and
a governmental unit under § 101 of the Code, the court retained jurisdiction).
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing Sandmar, 12 B.R. at 914); see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
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Thus, the court retained jurisdiction over the tribes by relying on the
Constitution, and the fact that the parties in interest involved tribal creditors
and a nontribal debtor concerning a dispute over property of the bankruptcy
estate located in sovereign, tribal territory."T The analysis in these
decisions, however, has been called into question.
A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, In re Greene,'' expressly
rejected the jurisdictional analysis articulated in Sandmar.'" Factually, the
case involved a bankruptcy trustee pursuing a preference action on behalf
of the bankruptcy estate against a tribal-owned furniture retailer who
peaceably repossessed the debtor's furniture prior to bankruptcy. The Greene
court primarily relied on United States v. Nordic Village, Inc,' holding
that the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over property of the estate and
jurisdiction to hear adversary proceedings fail to pierce the tribe's immunity
from suit.74 Concluding that jurisdiction and defenses to jurisdiction are
wholly distinct issues, the court refused to allow a broad congressional grant
of jurisdiction to abrogate all the accompanying defenses thereto. 7 '
The expansive view of tribal immunity and its effect on jurisdiction
articulated in Greene and Nordic Village appear to eliminate the precedential
effect of Sandmar and Shape, but the concurring opinion of the Greene
decision states that the common law sovereignty of Indian tribes is far from
absolute." According to the concurring opinion, the extent of tribal
sovereign immunity in commercial activities remains an "important,
complex, and unresolved question" worthy of debate.'" Because Congress
exercises plenary authority over tribes, tribal sovereign immunity, jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy court, and the bankruptcy laws, Congress should
clarify the eligibility, jurisdiction, and sovereign status of tribes under the
Code to eliminate the split of authority.
Although the sovereign immunity issue remained a major variable in the
bankruptcy courts' jurisdictional analysis, the Sandmar and Shape courts
articulated substantive justifications which perhaps can aid other bankruptcy
courts in the event jurisdictional issues arise when a tribe finds itself
involved in a bankruptcy case as a creditor. It is true that the repeal of 28
326 (1978).
170. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 329.
171. In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1039 (1994).
172. Id. at 598.
173. 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
174. Id. at 38.
175. Id.; Greene, 980 F.2d at 598.
176. Greene, 980 F.2d at 600.
177. Id.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
U.S.C. § 1471 compels consideration of the similar provisions in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334; nevertheless, the jurisdictional analysis in Sandmar and Shape is
helpful. Although the assumptions the courts made in Sandmar and Shape,
that the particular Indian tribes were "governmental units" and "entities" as
defined in § 101 of the Code, remains in question and worthy of further
discussion, one must also consider which jurisdiction's substantive property
law applies in the event a tribe files for protection under the Code.
6. Jurisdiction over Property of the Estate Created Under Section
541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
Assuming a tribe qualifies for relief under a chapter of the Code, a
bankruptcy court must ascertain which property law applies. Although
questions concerning whether property is part of the debtor's bankruptcy
estate is a question of federal law, state law ordinarily controls what interest
a debtor has in the property. 7 Section 541 of the Code governs what is
property of the debtor's estate, but state law determines a debtor's interest in
the property constituting property of the estate." The question of land title
and outright ownership of property, both real and personal, will be
substantiated and analyzed."' Without a cognizable determination of who
178. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
179. Id.
180. II U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000). The statute provides as follows:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property,
wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case.
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community property
as of the commencement of the case that is-
(A) under the sole, equal, or joint management and control of the debtor; or
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or for both an allowable
claim against the debtor and an allowable claim against the debtor's spouse, to
the extent that such interest is so liable.
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section 329(b),
363(n), 543, 550, 553, or 723 of this title.
(4) Any interest in property preserved for the benefit of or ordered
transferred to the estate under section 510(c) or 551 of this title.
(5) Any interest in property that would have been property of the estate if
such interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date of the filing of the
petition, and that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180
days after such date-
(A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance;
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controls tribal assets, difficult issues exist. Thus, a study of the ownership
of, for example, land and title of tribal land and possessions follows.'8
In 1831, the landmark case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia'" established
a trust relationship. Many scholars and courts attribute the inception of the
trust relationship existing between the United States and Indian tribes to
Chief Justice Marshall's statement: "[Tihe tribes'] relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."'8 3 In application, the trust
relationship dates back to the era of Chief Justice Marshall and protects the
sovereignty and self government of tribes while keeping the tribe subject to
the overriding power of the United States government.'" Although the
creation of the particular relationship was forced upon the various tribes in
1831 and reinforced in 1887 with the enactment of the General Allotment
Act, today it inures a benefit to tribes in the guardian/ward relationship with
tribes being the designated beneficiaries of the federal government's trustee
or guardian responsibility."'
The land represents trust property held by the government to protect
Indian land ownership.'" The benefits of the trust relationship are: (1) the
prohibition of the sale of Indian lands without federal consent; (2)
(B) as a result of a property settlement agreement with the debtor's spouse,
or of an interlocutory or final divorce decree; or
(C) as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or of a death benefit plan.
(6) Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the
estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual
debtor after the commencement of the case.
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement
of the case.
Id.
181. See Richard A. Monette, Governing Private Property in Indian Country; The
Double-Edged Sword of the Trust Relationship and Trust Responsibility Arising Out of Early
Supreme Court Opinions and the General Allotment Act, 25 N.M. L. REv. 35, 54 (1995)
(providing an in depth and thorough discussion of the early Supreme Court analysis on the
trust relationship and property right theories); In re Kedrowski, 284 B.R. 439 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 2002) (determining the relevant legal authority to determine property of the estate for
a debtor who was a member of an Indian tribe required consideration of federal law, state
law, a gaming compact between the tribe and the state, and tribe's gaming ordinance to
determine if gaming distributions paid to individual tribal members constitute property of the
bankruptcy estate).
182. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831).
183. Id. at 17; Monette, supra note 181, at 54; see also Robert Clinton, AMERICAN
INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 234 (1991); NICHOLAS J. SPAETH, AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW DESKBOOK 9 (1993).
184. Fredericks, supra note 14, at 382; see also Monette, supra note 181, at 43.
185. AM. INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, supra note 35, at 25.
186. Id. at 31. See generally Monette supra, note 181, at 43.
No. I1] 209
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
eliminating state control or power over recognized tribal territory; (3)
government-to-government relationship between tribal governments and the
federal government; (4) legal representation in litigation regarding trust
property and its management; (5) the right to claim federal lands; and (6)
the benefit of holding the federal government to a higher fiduciary duty of
loyalty in dealing with trust property.'" Recently, in Cobell v. Norton,'
the Federal Court of Appeals clearly articulated the fiduciary relationship
owed Indian tribes as the highest of moral obligations appropriately judged
by the most "exacting fiduciary standards."''
In application, the trust relationship plays some role in the event an
Indian tribe seeks protection under the Code. In the tribal-trust relationship,
the land, natural resources, and personal property are held in trust by the
United States.' " Tribes must obtain express approval from the federal
government to sell, convey, or encumber trust property.'"' As stated, tribal
properties are held in trust shielded from both voluntary and involuntary
alienation under state law." As one expert on the subject also noted, "the
tribes' status as governmental entities supports" the broad immunity that
protects tribes from divestiture of their property.'" The restraints on
alienation (i.e., the inability of tribes to leverage their land base or personal
holdings) of tribal property create difficulties for tribes in their efforts to
secure developmental capital from the private sector, and unless Congress
removes the restraints on alienation or offers financial relief, the restraints
may eliminate financing desperately needed during a bankruptcy reor-
ganization.'"
Similarly, personal property of tribes is held in trust in the United States
Treasury, but the funds can only be used to benefit the tribe or its members
in whose names the funds are credited." Authorization by treaty or
express provision of law represents the only manner that tribal funds can be
187. AM. INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, supra note 35, at 28; see also 25
U.S.C. § 175 (2000); COHEN, supra note 16, at 224-25; Seminole Nation v. United States,
316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942) (stating the federal government must abide by the "most exacting
fiduciary standards").
188. 240 F.3d 1081, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
189. Id. (citing Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 287).
190. AM. INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, supra note 35, at 58.
191. Id.
192. COHEN, supra note 16, at 519-20.
193. Id. at 520 (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 521 nn.87-89, 94 (citing very few cases and circumstances where Congress
or courts have authorized the alienation of Indian tribal lands).
195. Id. at 547-48 (noting that tribal funds are property of the tribe as an entity rather
than property of each individual member).
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appropriated. ' Perhaps, Congress can authorize the use of such funds in
the event a tribe seeks relief under the Code or authorize the right of tribes
to encumber property subject to the existing statutory safeguards found
under the Code and title 25. It is certain that Congress must clearly and
plainly authorize the use of tribal property or enact legislation such as the
Indian Financing Act of 1974 that insures, guarantees, and safeguards tribes
from financial stress." Because tribes have evolved into sophisticated
commercial entities involved in a diverse array of businesses, Congress
should allow tribes the right to reorganize under the Code by authorizing the
use of tribal assets.
Although tribes do not fully own tribal holdings and land they occupy or
possess, outright, the tribes' legal, equitable, and possessory interest in the
land would constitute part of the property of the estate under § 541 of the
Code in the event a tribe files for protection. Any interest or right to the use
of the proceeds of such land must also be approved by a bankruptcy court
after the filing of the case.
Federal judges typically apply state law while adjudicating questions
involving legal and equitable interests in property."" Closely connected to
the trust relationship issue, a serious question arises in regard to the
controlling law on property interests. The Supreme Court has held that
federal courts (e.g., a bankruptcy court), applying state law, decide what
constitutes the property of the estate of the debtor under § 541(a).' This
bankruptcy estate is automatically created upon filing a petition under the
Code. The bankruptcy estate, as defined in § 541 of the Code and
federal law, is extremely broad.2"' It is ordinarily state law, however, that
determines the debtor's property rights and interests in the assets comprising
the bankruptcy estate2 "2
It is well settled that the filing of a petition under § 541(a) of the Code
creates an estate comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor
196. Id.
197. Id. at 520 n.85 (noting that Indian Financing Act of 1974 established a revolving
loan fund as well as a loan guarantee and insurance program for loans procured from the
private sector).
198. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 58 (1979).
199. Id. at 54-55; Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966); Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S.
18 (1970) (holding that state law did not control whether certain property became property
of the estate).
200. I1 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000).
201. In re Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 367
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6322-23; S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5868.
202. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.
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in property as of the commencement of the case.""" 3 The interest in the
estate property held by the debtor (or commonly referred to as the "debtor
in possession" or DIP in a business reorganization), trustee, or the
bankruptcy estate at the time of the commencement of the case, is ascer-
tained pursuant to state law; state law does not apply, however, where it
would be inconsistent with other sections of the Code (e.g., §§ 363, 506(a),
544, 545, 547, 548, and 552). M Query, if a tribe files a voluntary petition
under the Code (or an involuntary petition is filed against a tribe), which
substantive property law applies? Is it state law or tribal law, absent some
application of federal bankruptcy law?"
Deeply rooted in this nation's history, tribes are free from state jurisdic-
tion and control. 2( Most tribes occupy sovereign territory where state law
does not apply. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in McClanahan v. State
Tax Commission, "state law could have no role to play within the reser-
vation [of an Indian tribe's] boundaries."2'"
It is suggested that Congress clarify which substantive property law will
apply, for example, to mortgages, security interests, and contractual
obligations in the event a tribe qualifies as an eligible entity filing for relief
under the bankruptcy laws. Perhaps, Congress can clarify and resolve both
of these issues before a bankruptcy court is confronted with such a complex
problem. With jurisdictional issues addressed in the context of tribes, one
also should consider the venue provisions governing bankruptcy cases and
proceedings.
D. Venue Provisions Governing Bankruptcy Cases and Proceedings
Interestingly, the proper venue (i.e., location or forum) for where a tribe
may file a bankruptcy case may generate debate. Indian tribes have operated
their own court systems for years and also have established their own
203. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000).
204. See id.; Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 397 (1992).
205. Compare In re Kedrowski, 284 B.R. 439 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2002). The court held
that distributions to individual tribal members generated from gaming revenues of a tribal
casino where the debtor was an enrolled member of an Indian tribe constituted property of
the individual's I I U.S.C. § 541 bankruptcy estate in the context of an individual member
of a tribe filing for personal bankruptcy. The court considered federal law, state law, a
gaming compact between the tribe and the state, and the tribe's gaming ordinance to
determine if the per capita distributions constituted property of the debtor's estate. Id
206. Indian Civil Rights Task Force, Development of Tripartite Jurisdiction in Indian
Country, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 351, 352 (1974) (citing Hon. Thurgood Marshall's observations
in Williams v. Lee, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973)).
207. 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973).
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structure and procedural rules governing the' tribunals." In fact, tribes
have exclusive jurisdiction over tribal affairs within Indian Country unless
the tribe relinquishes such power, or the power is explicitly stricken by
statute. ' Since 1970, tribal courts have increased in number as well as
sophistication. "" In 1978, the Supreme Court stated that "tribal courts have
repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive
adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests
of both Indians and non-Indians..21'
Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution seemingly
mandates that all bankruptcy cases and proceedings be conducted according
to uniform laws established by Congress in the federal court system." '
Therefore, a tribe involved in a bankruptcy case or proceeding may be
compelled to abide by the current venue provisions that govern all cases and
proceedings under the Code, absent "proceeding" abstention under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(c) or "case" abstention under 11 U.S.C. § 305(a). Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1334(e), the district court (i.e., the bankruptcy court after the
statutory reference under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)), shall have the exclusive
jurisdiction of all of the debtor's property, wherever located, of the debtor
as of the commencement of such case, and of the property of the bankruptcy
estate." ' Bankruptcy cases and proceedings involving a tribe seemingly
would operate in the same manner as any other bankruptcy case or
proceeding in the bankruptcy court. Nevertheless, congressional fine-tuning
may be necessary to avoid expensive and time-consuming legal disputes in
light of the fact that a majority of tribes, are located within sovereign
territory and are technically not necessarily "residents" within any federal
judicial district.
208. COHEN, supra note 16, at 251, 332.
209. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Fisher v. District Court,
424 U.S. 382 (1976); see also Indian Civil Rights Task Force, supra note 206, at 351.
210. AM. INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, supra note 35, at 17; see also I AM.
INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 95TH CONG., FINAL REPORT 163 (Comm. Print 1977)
(stating that of the 287 tribal governments in operation in the United States, 117 had
operating tribal courts in 1976).
211. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978).
212. U.S. CONST, art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
213. See In re Sandmar Corp., 12 B.R. 910, 915 (D.N.M. 1981); In re Shape, 25 B.R.
356, 359 (D. Mont. 1982) (utilizing 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (repealed), replaced by a similar
grant under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) allowing a bankruptcy court to dismiss arguments to avoid
participating in a case or proceeding in a bankruptcy court based on tribal sovereignty or the
powers of tribes to enact their own bankruptcy laws).
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1. Case Venue Under 28 U.S.C. § 1408
Upon the debtor's seeking relief under the Code, the debtor ordinarily
has two choices in regard to venue (i.e., where the bankruptcy case will
be filed). Cases can be commenced in the bankruptcy court"' for the
district where the debtor has a domicile, residence, or principal place of
business, or principal assets for the 180 days immediately preceding the
filing of the case, or the place where the debtor spent most of its time
during the 180 days prior to the filing."' A case may also be filed in the
district in which there is a case pending with a debtor's affiliate.
2 6
More specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1408(l)-(2) provides as follows:
Except as provided in section 1410 of this title, a case under title
11 may be commenced in the district court for the district -
214. See I COLLIER, supra note 134, § 4.01[1] (indicating the intent of title 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334 is that venue be placed in the district courts, rather than the bankruptcy courts, even
though almost all of the activity in the case will occur in the latter).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1408(l) (2000); see, e.g., in re Frame, 120 B.R. 718, 771 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990).
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (2000). "Affiliate" is not defined in title 28; however, it is
defined in II U.S.C. § 101(2) as follows:
"Affiliate" means -
(A) entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to
vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other
than an entity that holds such securities -
(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity without sole discretionary power to vote
such securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debtor, if such entity has not in fact exercised such
power to vote:
(B) corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities
are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the
debtor, or by an entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with
power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the
debtor, other than an entity that holds such securities -
(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity without sole discretionary power to vote
such securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if such entity has not in fact exercised such
power to vote;
(C) person whose business is operated under a lease or operating agreement
by a debtor, or person substantially all of whose property is operated under an
operating agreement with the debtor; or
(D) entity that operates the business or substantially all of the property of the
debtor under a lease or operating agreement.
11 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2000).
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(1) in which the domicile, residence, principal place of
business in the United States, or principal assets in the United
States, of the person or entity that is the subject of such case
have been located for the one hundred and eighty days im-
mediately preceding such commencement, or for a longer
portion of such one-hundred-and-eighty-day period than the
domicile, residence, or principal place of business, in the United
States, or principal assets in the United States, of such person
were located in any other district; or
(2) in which there is pending a case under title I 1 concerning
such person's affiliate, general partner, or partnership."7
With respect to venue, no statutory distinction is mentioned or drawn
in 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) among natural persons, partnerships, and cor-
porations."" Likewise, the drafters deliberately used the inclusive word
"entity" intending to cover all of the terms relating to all participants
possibly filing for protection under the Code."9 Thus, a tribe may
qualify as an "entity" for purposes of determining venue in a bankruptcy
case, discussed infra.
2. Proceeding Venue Under 28 U.S.C. § 1409
The proceeding venue provisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1409 attempt to
facilitate and promote administrative convenience and fairness in
bankruptcy proceedings. "' Title 28 U.S.C. § 1409 governs venue for
most bankruptcy proceedings. A "proceeding" arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to a "case" ordinarily may be commenced in the same
bankruptcy court in which the main case is pending.' That is, as a
general rule, venue for all of the proceedings within a case is proper
wherever the main bankruptcy case is pending."
More specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1409:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (d),
a proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a
217. 28 U.S.C. § 1408(l)-(2) (2000).
218. 1 COLLIER, supra note 134, § 4.01[1].
219. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 311 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6268;
S. REP. No. 95-989, at 24 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5809.
220. BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 605.4
(4th ed. 1996).
221. 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2000).
222. Id.
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case under title 11 may be commenced in the district court in
which such case is pending.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, a
trustee in a case under title II may commence a proceeding
arising in or related to such case to recover a money judgment
of or property worth less than $1,000 or a consumer debt of
less than $5,000 only in the district court for the district in
which the defendant resides.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a
trustee in a case under title II may commence a proceeding
arising in or related to such case as statutory successor to the
debtor or creditors under section 541 or 544(b) of title 11 in the
district court for the district where the State or Federal court
sits in which, under applicable nonbankruptcy venue provisions,
the debtor or creditors, as the case may be, may have com-
menced an action on which such proceeding is based if the case
under title 11 had not been commenced.
(d) A trustee may commence a proceeding arising under title
II or arising in or related to a case under title 11 based on a
claim arising after the commencement of such case from the
operation of the business of the debtor only in the district court
for the district where a State or Federal court sits in which,
under applicable nonbankruptcy venue provisions, an action on
such claim may have been brought.
(e) A proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related
to a case under title 11, based on a claim arising after the
commencement of such case from the operation of the business
of the debtor, may be commenced against the representative of
the estate in such case in the district court for the district where
the State or Federal court sits in which the party commencing
such proceeding may, under applicable nonbankruptcy venue
provisions, have brought an action on such claim, or in the
district court in which such case is pending. 23
Four exceptions to the general rule require the trustee, or debtor-in-
possession, to commence proceedings in the judicial district where the
defendant resides (or "under applicable nonbankruptcy venue
provisions")."" By virtue of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
9001(10), trustee includes a debtor-in-possession in a chapter II case. The
223. 28 U.S.C. § 1409 (2000).
224. Id. § 1409(b)-(e).
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first venue exception involves proceedings where the trustee (or debtor-in-
possession) seeks to recover either a money judgment 'of less than $1000
or property worth less than $1000 or attempts to enforce a consumer debt
of less than $5000. "' The second exception allows the trustee or debtor-
in-possession to file proceedings where the case is not pending when the
trustee acts to recover property as the statutory successor to the debtor or
creditors. 26 The third exception allows the trustee (or debtor-in-posses-
sion) to pursue postpetition claims, arising under state or foreign law, only
in the district where a state or federal court sits where the claim arose.",
The final exception allows a third party (i.e., a plaintiff-postpetition
creditor) to sue the trustee (or debtor-in-possession) either in the district
where the case is pending or the state or federal court where the claim
arose."' Thus, parties in interest who transact business with trustees or
debtors-in-possession subsequent to the filing of the petition, may be sued
only in the district where the claim arose; however, such parties may file
suit against the trustee or debtor-in-possession in the bankruptcy court
where the case is pending or an appropriate state or federal court where
the claim arose thus eliminating undue costs incurred by small creditors
seeking to minimize collection costs.
3. Change of Case or Proceeding Venue Under 28 U.S.C. § 1412
The district court can transfer a bankruptcy case or proceeding to a
different district "in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the
parties" under 28 U.S.C. § 1412.9 Rule 1014 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure implements 28 U.S.C. § 1412 and governs motions
to change the venue of "cases.""' Rule 7087 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure governs motions to change the venue of
"proceedings." The burden of proof must be carried by a preponderance
of evidence by the moving party seeking to change such venue."'
The traditional factors considered by the bankruptcy court in transfer-
ring venue include, inter alia, the location of the debtor's principal place
225. Id. § 1409(b).
226. Id. § 1409(c).
227. Id. § 1409(d).
228. Id. § 1409(e).
229. Id. § 1412. The statute provides as follows: "A district court may transfer a case
or proceeding under title I I to a district court for another district, in the interest of justice
or for the convenience of the parties." Id.
230. 1 COLLIER, supra note 134, § 4.04[21.
231. Id. § 4.04[1] (citing In re Peachtree Lance Assocs. Ltd., 150 F.3d 788 (7th Cir.
1999); Puerto Rico v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 596 F2d 1239 (5th Cir.1979); De Rosa
v. C.B.C. Corp., 49 B.R. 935 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
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of business; location of the debtor's estate or principal assets; location of
the alleged activities, transaction, or misconduct; determination of where
the case can be efficiently and economically administered; the necessity
and location of any ancillary administration or compulsory service; and
multiple other factors the court may consider in a particular case. 32
Importantly, despite allegations of improper venue, some courts have held
that they possess the power to transfer, dismiss, or retain a case in order
to accommodate the parties in cases involving numerous creditors or assets
in several states. 33
4. Case Dismissal and Change of Case Venue Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1014
Rule 1014(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure allows
the bankruptcy court to dismiss or transfer a case filed in a proper district
on timely motion of a party in interest and after hearing on notice to the
petitioner, the U.S. trustee, and other entities as directed by the court.
Pursuant to Rule 1014(a)(l), the court has discretion to dismiss the case
or transfer a properly filed or venued case to another district in the interest
of justice or for the convenience of the parties.
Likewise, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 101 4(a)(2) governs the
venue of cases filed in an improper district.2"3 This procedural rule
specifically allows courts to dismiss or transfer cases after analysis of the
facts for the convenience of the parties or in the interest of justice.
Although a majority of cases hold that a bankruptcy court must transfer
or dismiss an improperly venued case upon a timely motion, authority
exists that allows a bankruptcy court to retain a case filed in an improper
venue in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties. 36
232. 1 COLLIER, supra note 134, § 4.04[a][ii].
233. See, e.g., In re Baltimore Food Sys., Inc., 71 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1983); In
re Am. Window Corp., 15 B.R. 803 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (stating that the court can retain
a case in an improper venue in the interest of justice).
234. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a) ("Dismissal and transfer of cases"). The Rule states:
(1) Cases filed in proper district. If a petition is filed in a proper district, on
timely motion of a party in interest and after hearing on notice to the
petitioners, the United States trustee, and other entities as directed by the court,
the case may be transferred to any other district if the court determines that the
transfer is in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties.
Id. It is noted that the transfer of "proceedings" is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1412 and FED.
R. BANKR. P. 7087.
235. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a).
236. See In re Lazaro, 128 B.R. 168, 174 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (questioning the
presumptions expressed in the Advisory Committee note and concluding that the 1984
BAFJA amendments did not strip the bankruptcy court of the authority to retain a case filed
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Because venue is a waivable defect, a motion asserting improper case
venue must be timely filed by a party in interest.2" Venue objections are
waived if a party in interest fails to file a timely objection. Case dismissal,
rather than a change of venue, is considered a harsh remedy and should
be made, where possible, without legal prejudice."
Finally, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1014(b) establishes the
procedure for determining venue in cases involving a single debtor in
different districts. In the event multiple cases are filed in more than one
district against a single debtor and its agents, the court where the initial
petition was filed must decide the proper forum."9 Meanwhile, the
proceedings on the other petitions in the subsequent cases are stayed until
the court where the initial petition was filed determines which venue is
proper. 21U
5. Change of Adversary Proceeding Venue Under Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 7087
To further complicate matters for a nonbankruptcy practitioner, the
transfer or change of venue of "adversary proceedings" is governed by
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7087, which also implements 28
U.S.C. § 1412.241 The entire adversary proceeding, or any part thereof,
can be transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1412 except as provided in
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7019(2).212 This rule, Rule
7019(2), is also invoked when a joined party properly files a timely
motion asserting improper venue; this requires the court to determine
in the improper venue in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties); see,
e.g., In re United States Aviex Co., Inc., 96 B.R. 874, 882 (N.D. Ind. 1989); In re Baltimore
Food Sys., Inc., 71 B.R. 795, 804 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1986); In re Leonard, 55 B.R. 106, 110
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1985); In re Boeckman, 54 B.R. 110, III (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985); In re
Butcher, 46 B.R. 109, 112 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985). But see In re Pick, 95 B.R. 712, 715-16
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1989); In re Cunningham, No. 88-4045, slip op. at 7 (D.S.D. 1988); In re
Townsend, 84 B.R. 764, 766-67 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1988); In re Greiner, 45 B.R. 715, 716
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (holding that a bankruptcy court does not have the authority to retain
a case filed in an improper venue).
237. In re Mandalay Shores Coop. Hous. Ass'n Inc., 63 B.R. 842 (N.D. Ill. 1986); In
re Smith Jones, 13 B.R. 804 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
238. See In re Hall, Bayoutree Assocs., Ltd., 939 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1991).
239. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(b).
240. Id.
241. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7087. The Rule provides: "On motion and after a hearing, the
court may transfer an adversary proceeding or any part thereof to another district pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1412, except as provided in Rule 7019(2)." Id.
242. Id.
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whether the whole proceeding or any part thereof should be transferred to
another district. 43
Absent express direction by the court, the procedural rule governing
adversary proceedings, Rule 7087, does not expressly apply to "contested
matters"' " under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9014 (i.e., events
not illustrated as Part VII adversary proceedings or initiated by filing a
complaint). 45 Such contested matters are governed by Rule 9014 unless
the court expressly directs that Rule 7087 shall apply. For example, the
court may direct that Rule 7087 shall apply to a given contested mat-
ter." After attaining general understanding of venue in bankruptcy cases
and proceedings, the eligibility of tribes under the current framework of
the Bankruptcy Code must be analyzed.
243. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7019. The Rule provides:
Rule 19 F.R. Civ. P. applies in adversary proceedings, except that (1) if an
entity joined as a party raises the defense that the court lacks jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the defense is sustained, the court shall dismiss such
entity from the adversary proceeding and (2) if an entity joined as a party
properly and timely raises the defense of improper venue, the court shall
determine, as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1412 whether that part of the proceeding
involving the joined party shall be transferred to another district, or whether the
entire adversary proceeding shall be transferred to another district.
Id.
244. Examples of "contested matters" are governed by Rule 9014: motion for relief from
the automatic stay under section 362(d) of the Code; motion to dismiss the case; trustee's
objection to proof of claim; motion to use cash collateral, or an objection to confirmation of
a plan.
245. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014. The Rule provides:
In a contested matter in a case under the Code not otherwise governed by these
rules, relief shall be requested by motion, and reasonable notice and opportunity
for hearing shall be afforded the party against whom relief is sought. No
response is required under this rule unless the court orders an answer to a
motion. The motion shall be served in the manner provided for service of a
summons and complaint by Rule 7004, and, unless the court otherwise directs,
the following rules shall apply: 7021, 7025, 7026, 7028- 7037, 7041, 7042,
7052, 7054-7056, 7064, 7069, and 7071. The court may at any stage in a
particular matter direct that one or more of the other rules in Part VII shall
apply.
Id.
246. Id. When a court directs that all of the Part VII rules apply to a "contested matter,"
the court is essentially administering the matter in similar fashion as an "adversary
proceeding" which is often described as a complete civil lawsuit within a bankruptcy case
requiring adherence to procedural formalities as outlined in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure.
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IV. Discussion of the Eligibility of Indian Tribes Under the Bankruptcy
Code
As many tribes diversify economically, the potential for commercial or
financial failure concomitantly increases. Some tribes are now involved in
capital intensive projects likely to suffer unforseen financial distress. The
question remains: How will commercially involved tribes be treated in the
event they file for protection under the Code?
A. Definitions and Eligibility under 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 109
The Code does not statutorily define a tribe nor does it specifically
address whether a tribe is eligible for relief as a petitioner-debtor under the
laws of Congress relating to bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 used
the term "Indian territory" in section 1(24); however, Congress failed to
include the term in subsequent bankruptcy acts, and no explanation exists
regarding the omission of the term in the 1978 version of the Code or its
subsequent revisions. 47 Therefore, tribes must be classified within the
existing definitions in the Code.
1. Introductory Definitions
Section 101 of the Code contains statutory definitions. An understanding
of these statutorily prescribed and traditional definitions is helpful prior to
a discussion of the eligibility of tribes to file petitions under one or more of
the operative chapters of the Code, if at all.
a) Person
Section 101(41) of the Code defines a "person" as an individual,
partnership, corporation, and, in some instances, a governmental unit.'
Black's Law Dictionary also defines a person as "a human being" and "an
entity . . . recognized by law as having the rights and duties of a human
being." 9
b) Corporation
The Code broadly defines a "corporation" in § 101(9)."' Black's Law
247. In re Sandmar Corp., 12 B.R. 910, 913 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981).
248. 11 U.S.C. 101(41) (2000).
249. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162 (7th ed. 1999).
250. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (2000). The statute states:
(A) includes-
(i) an association having the power or privilege that a private corporation,
but not an individual or a partnership, possesses;
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Dictionary also defines a corporation as "a group or succession of persons
established in accordance with legal rules into a legal or juristic person that
has legal personality distinct from the natural persons who make it up, exists
indefinitely apart from them, and has the legal powers that its constitution
gives it.""2 Black's Law Dictionary additionally provides the following
definitions:
Foreign Corporation: "A corporation that was organized and chartered
under the laws of another state, government, or country.""2
De Jure Corporation: "A corporation formed in accordance with all
applicable laws and recognized as a corporation for liability purposes.""
Cooperative Corporation: "An entity that has a corporate existence, but
is primarily organized for the purpose of providing services and profits to
its members and not for corporate profit."'
Quasi-Corporation: "An entity that exercises some of the functions of a
corporation but that has not been granted corporate status by statute ...
(such as a county or school district)."2 "
c) Family
The Code does not define the word "family." It does, however, define a
"family farmer" under § 101(18) of the Code."6 Black's Law Dictionary
also defines "family" as "[a] group of persons connected by blood, by
affinity, or by law.""7
d) Farmer
Section 101(20) defines "farmer" as a person, except a family farmer,
"that received more than 80 percent of such person's gross income during
the taxable year of such person immediately preceding the taxable year of
such person during which case under this title concerning such person was
(ii) partnership association organized under a law that makes only the capital
subscribed responsible for the debts of such association;
(iii) joint-stock company;
(iv) unincorporated company or association; or
(v) business trust; but
(B) does not include limited partnership.
Id.
251. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 249, at 341.
252. Id. at 343.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 342.
255. Id. at 344.
256. 11 U.S.C. § 101(18) (2000).
257. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 249, at 620.
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Section 101(21) of the Code defines "farming operation" as all activities
including "farming, tillage of the soil, dairy farming, ranching, production
or raising crops, poultry, or livestock, and production of poultry or livestock
products in an un-manufactured state.""9
f) Entity
Section 101(15) of the Code expressly provides that an "'entity' includes
[a] person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and United States trustee.
's2 '
The dictionary definition of the word "entity" describes an entity as "[a]n
organization (such as a business or governmental unit) that has a legal
identity apart from its members. " '
g) Governmental Unit
The Code defines a governmental unit in § 101 (27). A governmental unit
is expansively defined under the Code to include any state, department,
agency, or instrumentality of the United States, or a foreign or domestic
government.2" The dictionary definition of a governmental unit classifies
a governmental unit as "a subdivision, agency, department, county, parish,




These definitions are listed because the terms are employed when
discussing and analyzing tribes under the Code.
Reported cases exist that classify tribes as "governmental units" and
"entities" as defined in chapter 1 of the Code. For example, in In re
Sandmar Corp. and In re Shape, the courts held that the automatic stay
applied to tribes as creditors of debtors under the Code because 11 U.S.C.
§ 362 applies to all "entities."2'  Because the statutory definition of
"entity" includes the term "governmental unit," these courts impliedly
concluded that tribes are governmental units subject to the automatic
stay."  Although the court utilized statutorily defined terms listed above
258. 11 U.S.C. § 101(20) (2000).
259. Id. § 101(21).
260. Id. § 101(15).
261. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 249, at 553.
262. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2000).
263. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 249, at 704.
264. In re Sandmar Corp., 12 B.R. 910, 915 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981); In re Shape, 25
B.R. 356, 358 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1982).
265. Id.
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as defined in § 101 of the Code, the court failed to offer any detailed
explanation or substantiate how it arrived at a conclusion regarding such a
classification of tribes that enjoy the status of sovereign nations.
In 1994, the court in In re Vianese concluded that § 106(a) of the Code
applies to tribes because they comprise "governmental units" as defined in
§ 101(27)." This court noted that Indian nations are considered "domestic
dependent nations" resulting in their inclusion under § 101(27) as
"governmental units" because the specific statutory wording, "foreign or
domestic government," is utilized in that section of the Code. 1 However,
in a recent case, In re National Cattle Congress, a bankruptcy court held
that tribes fail to fit within the definition of "governmental units" under §
101(27) of the Code despite the inclusion of the term "foreign or domestic
government" in the definition of a governmental unit as prescribed in §
101(27) of the Code!" The court refused to abrogate a tribe's sovereign
immunity under § 106(a) of the Code because the term "Indian tribe" was
not expressly included in the definition of a governmental unit under §
101(27).
It is obvious that a split of authority exists among bankruptcy courts
treating tribes as "governmental units" under the Code. Perhaps, further
examination of the eligibility of tribes is necessary.
2. Eligibility Under Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code
As stated earlier, the Code does not expressly define or even mention the
term "Indian tribe." Thus, each operative chapter of the Code (i.e., chapter
7, 9, 11, [12] and 13) is analyzed and addressed separately in order to
determine whether an "Indian tribe" constitutes an eligible entity, person,
corporation, or governmental unit under a specific chapter under the Code
that is eligible for voluntary relief under § 301, or an involuntary petition
under § 303.
Section 109 elucidates the express parameters and dollar limitations
governing debtor eligibility and specifically eliminates and clarifies
eligibility utilizing the definitions stated in § 101 of the Code." ' The
266. In re Vianese, 195 B.R. 572, 576 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995).
267. Id.
268. 247 B.R. 259, 267 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000).
269. Id. (holding that tribal sovereignty could not be abrogated unless the statute
unequivocally and unambiguously stated that it applied to Indian tribes; therefore, because
the statute in question only specifically mentioned "States" and "foreign governments," Indian
tribes could not be classified as "governmental units" pursuant to § 101(27)).
270. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2000); id. § 104(b) ("Adjustment of dollar amounts") (allowing
for the automatic adjustment of dollar amounts to occur every three years effective on April
I to reflect the change in the Consumer Price Index rounded to the nearest $25 amount). For
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analysis begins by applying § 109 of the Code, "Who may be a debtor," to
each operative chapter under the Code. 7' Each chapter is discussed
separately for a clearer understanding regarding the eligibility of tribes as
participants under the Code.
a) Eligibility to Be a Debtor Under Chapter 13
Chapter 13 of the Code allows an eligible, individual debtor to retain all
his assets and typically use post-petition income to satisfy creditors, in part
or in full, under a court-confirmed plan supervised by a chapter 13
trustee.'2 The qualifications to file a petition under chapter 13 of the Code
require that a debtor be an "individual with regular income" as statutorily
defined under § 101(30)."'
"Individual with regular income" is further defined in § 101(30) of the
Code as "an individual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to
enable such individual to make payments under a chapter 13 plan of this
title.""27 Although individuals are always "persons" under the Code, all
persons are not, ipso facto, individuals eligible for relief under chapter 13
of the Code. Although a corporation and a partnership are "persons" under
§ 101(41), they both fail to statutorily qualify under the definition of an
individual eligible for relief under chapter 13. Any statutory right to file a
petition under chapter 13 is eliminated if the debtor is a corporation or
partnership." Therefore, tribes fail to meet the initial or threshold
statutory requirement outlined in § 109(e) of the Code and are ineligible for
relief under chapter 13. Although, as noted, individual members of tribes
may be eligible for such relief despite the fact that the Code contains no
provisions on the rights of Native Americans to file for bankruptcy.Y
Of course, an individual tribe member may qualify as a "person" and an
"individual" eligible for relief under chapter 13 as long as the individual
earns regular income as prescribed in § 101(30).7 Unless specifically
example, this automatic adjustment occurred April I, 2001, elevating the noncontingent,
liquidated, secured debt limitations for a debtor filing under chapter 13 from $807,750 to
$871,550.
271. Id. § 109.
272. See id. § 101(30); id. § 109(a).
273. Id. § 109(e).
274. id. § 101(30).
275. See I DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 2-2 (1992).
276. 1 DANIEL R. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 3.6, at 242 (7th ed.
1998) (indicating that under the previous Bankruptcy Act, Native Americans could file for
voluntary petitions because the right to do so was evidently not disputed); see also In re
Denison, 38 F.2d 662 (D. Okla. 1930), appeal dismissed, 45 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1930); In
re Russie, 96 F. 609 (D. Or. 1899); In re Colegrove, 9 B.R. 337 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1981).
277. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(30) (2000) (defining "individual with regular income" as an
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excluded, tribal members, as "persons," are included in "a general statute"
such as bankruptcy, federal firearm statutes, and tax statutes.278 Thus,
individual Indian citizens are eligible to file for chapter 13 relief provided
they earn regular income. Because tribes are not "individuals," a tribe may
not utilize chapter 13. However, tribes may constitute an entity, corporation,
or partnership. The entire tribe itself may constitute a governmental unit
amenable to chapter 9 of the Code.
b) Eligibility to Be a Debtor Under Chapter 9
Chapter 9 of the Code is available to certain "governmental units" seeking
an adjustment of debts with creditors.2" Not all governmental units are
eligible for relief under chapter 9, "Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality."
Chapter 9 is rarely utilized. In fact, only 198 chapter 9 cases were filed
between 1980 and 199 6 ."' Chapter 9 of the Code does not contemplate
asset liquidation or cessation of business operations - it is reorganization.
In order to meet the eligibility requirement under chapter 9 of the Code, an
eligible entity must meet all of the statutory requirements enumerated in §
109(c) of the Code.2 ' The definition of a "municipality" under the Code
individual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make
payments under a plan under chapter 13 of this title, other than a stockbroker or a commodity
broker); id. § 101(41) (defining a "person"); In re Colegrove, 9 B.R. 337 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1981).
278. Aubertin v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 446 F. Supp. 430, 434'(E.D. Wash.
1978).
279. Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425 (1993) (providing an excellent
discussion of the history, development, and current status of municipal bankruptcy and
chapter 9 of the Code); see also David S. Kupetz, Municipal Debt Adjustment Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 27 URB. LAW. 531 (1994) (discussing the different treatment of
municipalities under the Code as arising, in part, due to the sovereign immunity provision
contained in the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
280. NAT'L BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS 981 (1997) (ch. 4, "Other Recommendations and Issues"); see also ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS (1996).
281. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2000). The statute states as follows:
(c) An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and only if such
entity-
(I) is a municipality;
(2) is specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name,
to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or
organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor
under such chapter;
(3) is insolvent;
(4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such debts; and
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requires that an entity be subject to control by a public authority, a political
subdivision, public agency, or an instrumentality of a state.2 "
Section 101(40) of the Code attempts to clarify the definition of
municipality by defining it as a "political subdivision or public agency or
instrumentality of a State."2' 3 A state, itself, is not an eligible entity for
relief under chapter 9 of the Code .2  The "entity" filing the petition under
chapter 9 must be a "municipality" and be "specifically authorized, in its
capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a debtor under such chapter by
state law. '
By virtue of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, § 109(c)(2) of the Code
now requires that state law must provide express, written authority for a
municipality to file a petition under chapter 9 . ' Clearly, this requirement
would be contrary to the notion of tribal self-determination and Supreme
Court precedent safeguarding the self-governing rights of tribes."7 A tribe
and a state government are distinct, sovereign entities. It is contrary to the
principles of sovereignty to require one sovereign to obtain prior permission
of another as a precondition for relief under the Code. Thus, the plain
(5)(A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in
amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a
plan in a case under such chapter;
(B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain the
agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of
each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under such
chapter;
(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is imprac-
ticable; or
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that
is avoidable under section 547 of this title.
Id.
282. 1 COLLIER, supra note 134, § 109.04[3][a]; see also In re Greene County Hosp.,
59 B.R. 388, 389 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
283. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2000). But see In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 602
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that the definition of political subdivision is unclear and
requires analysis of section 81(7) of the Act).
284. 1 COLLIER, supra note 134, § 109.04[3][al[i].
285. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1), (2) (2000) (emphasis added).
286. 1 COLLIER, supra note 134, § 109.0413][b]; see County of Orange, 183 B.R. at 604
(stating that the authority to file a plan must be exact, plain, and direct with well-defined
limits so that nothing is left to inference or implication).
287. See Indian Civil Rights Task Force, supra note 206, at 382 (citing the following
cases that define the governing rights and jurisdictional boundaries of Indian tribes: Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971); and
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm., 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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language of § 109(c)(2) precludes a tribe from qualifying as a "municipality"
eligible for relief under chapter 9.
Assuming arguendo that the factors in § 109(c)(2), as well as the other
relevant factors are met, the fact that the word "entity" is utilized in § 109(c)
suggests that an analysis of § 101(15) of the Code should be made in order
to determine if a tribe is eligible for relief under chapter 9. An "entity," as
defined in the Code, "includes a person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and
United States trustee."' " It is noted that as a rule of statutory construction,
§ 101(15) utilizes the word "includes" which means the terms found in the
section are not limiting."9
Because the word "entity" is used in § 109(c) and qualifies as an eligible
participant for relief under chapter 9 of the Code, the definition of "entity"
statutorily prescribed in § 101(15) includes governmental unit; thus, §
101(27) must be analyzed and read concurrently. Section 101(27) of the
Code specifically defines a governmental unit as:
United States; State, Commonwealth; District; Territory;
municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality
of the United States (but not a United States trustee while serving
as a trustee in a case under this title), a State, a Commonwealth,
a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other
foreign or domestic government.
With these principles in mind, one might be tempted to conclude that the
use of the word "entity" in § 109(c) broadly includes the term "governme-
ntal unit" in a systematic reading of the Code.' The threshold analysis
begins with the term "entity" as it is written and found in § 109(c). The use
of the term "entity" mandates a study of the Code's definition of "entity"
under § 101 (15) which includes the term "governmental unit." The inclusion
of the term "governmental unit" compels a study of the Code's definition of
the term "governmental unit" which at first glance might include the
description of a domestic government.
This conclusion, however, ignores a fundamental rule regarding statutory
construction and analysis. It is well settled that a precisely drawn statute
dealing with a specific subject controls over a statute governing a more
generalized spectrum.' 9 Likewise, a more specific statute takes precedence
288. Id. § 101(15).
289. Id. § 102(3) (stating that the words "includes" and "including" are not limiting).
290. Id. § 101(27) (emphasis added).
291. See, e.g., In re Vianese, 195 B.R. 572 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995); In re Nat'l Cattle
Cong., 247 B.R. 259 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000); In re Bison Heating & Equip., 177 B.R. 785
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995).
292. Lindsey v. Solutions Exch., Inc., 178 B.R. 895, 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995);
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over a more general statute.' Because § 109(c) is a specific statute
particularly addressing the eligibility of municipalities, the rule of statutory
construction eliminates the presumptive conclusion that a tribe qualifies as
a municipality despite the skillful application of the multiple definitions and
terms in §§ 101 and 109 of the Code. It is certain that tribes are a
collective, qualified group, and sovereign entity similar to, perhaps, a
corporation or partnership.
c) Eligibility to Be a Debtor Under Chapter 11
Chapter 11 of the Code is designed to give financially distressed
businesses and individuals an opportunity to reorganize or liquidate.' A
"person" eligible to be a chapter 7 debtor ordinarily is eligible for relief
under chapter 11 with limited exception (e.g., stockbrokers and commodity
brokers).' The use of the term "person" calls for an analysis of the
definition of that word as it is used in § 101(41).
The statutory definition of "person" broadly includes an individual, a
partnership, a corporation, and, in some very limited circumstances, a
governmental unit.' Corporations are commonly defined as persons
recognized by law possessing the same "rights and duties of a human
being."'"7 Additionally, Black's Law Dictionary defines a corporation as
"[a] group or succession of persons established in accordance with legal
rules into a legal or juristic person that has legal personality distinct from
the natural persons who make it up ... [possessing] the legal powers that
its constitution gives it."'2
After considering the multiple definitions of "persons" and "corporations,"
a tribe most closely resembles a "corporation." Tribes are groups of persons
officially organized under tribal constitutions as authorized under the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934. Like corporations, tribes are led by a governing
body, a tribal board or council, that performs duties akin to a board of
directors of a corporation.'" Just like private and public corporations,
tribes engage in various commercial activities for profit.
United States v. Louwsma, 970 F.2d 797, 799 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
293. In re Patterson, 107 B.R. 576, 578 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); Busic v. United
States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980).
294. COWANS, supra note 276, § 3.6.
295. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d) (2000).
296. Id. § 101(41).
297. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 249, at 1162.
298. Id. at 334.
299. See, e.g., Cow Creek/Umpqua Tribe: Organization Chart, at http://www.cowcreek.
com/govt/xO2orgchart.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2002) (providing analysis into the
governmental hierarchy and Organizational Chart of one Indian tribe).
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Considering the broad definitions of corporate entities, mentioned and
defined earlier, one can logically argue that a tribe is easily classified as a
"foreign corporation" organized under the laws of the federal government.
Likewise, a tribe may be considered a "cooperative corporation" because it
provides services and distributes any corporate profits to its tribal members
in a de facto corporation. The analogies seem infinite; however, no authority
properly analogizes tribes as a qualified, defined, and eligible entity under
the Code.
Similarly, a tribe could be classified as a type of partnership. Under the
Uniform Partnership Act, a partnership is "an association of two or more
persons who carry on as co-owners [of] a business for profit." ' Tribes are
composed of two or more persons who may engage in commercial activities
for profit. In essence, tribes may qualify as de facto partnerships despite the
absence of a formal partnership agreement. It is noted that a formal
agreement is not necessary to properly form a partnership. "' The only
requirements necessary for a finding that a partnership exists are two or
more persons as co-owners engaged in a business for a profit." Therefore,
tribes could be viewed as partnerships because they are collective groups of
individuals engaged in commercial activities for profit.
Tribes, however, are more than a simple organization of individuals. The
United States Supreme Court has indicated that tribes are more than private,
voluntary organizations.' 3 The Court classifies tribes as sovereign "aggre-
gations" and "a separate people" with the power to regulate and control
internal social relations." Query, does this holding negate the ability to
classify a tribe as a corporation or partnership under the Code? Perhaps, the
need exists for Congress to specifically define and delineate the treatment
of a tribe as an eligible, demarcated participant under the Code.
d) Eligibility to Be a Debtor Under Chapter 7
Chapter 7 of the Code is entitled "Liquidation." It is sometimes referred
to as "straight bankruptcy." A typical chapter 7 case requires a debtor to
surrender all non-exempt assets to a bankruptcy trustee who abandons
burdensome properties, sells off other properties, and distributes the
proceeds under a statutory scheme of distribution."
300. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 393 (2001).
301. REv. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 101(7) cmt. (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 63 (2001)
(stating that a partnership agreement need not be written).
302. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 393.
303. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
304. Id.
305. COWANS, supra note 276, § 3.4.
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Section 109(b) of the Code governs eligibility for relief under chapter 7.
A "person," as defined in § 101(41), is eligible for relief under this chapter
with the express exception of, for example, railroads, domestic insurance
companies, banks, and savings and loan associations."
Most debtors eligible for relief under chapter 11 also qualify as eligible
debtors under chapter 7, and the same analysis addressing eligibility under
chapter 11 applies in chapter 7. As noted, individual members of tribes are
qualified to file for relief by virtue of the fact that they qualify as a "person"
and "individual" under the Code, and assertions of sovereign immunity fail
to shield tribal members from suits when acting in an unofficial capacity.'"
e) Eligibility to Be a Debtor Under Chapter 12
Chapter 12 of the Code is entitled "Family Farmer Adjustments" and was
legislatively created as part of the Bankruptcy Judges, United States
Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986." This chapter is
used exclusively for "family farmers with regular annual income" who have
assets and liabilities within a designated statutory amount who file petitions
in an attempt to save their family farms." Although chapter 12 was
scheduled to "sunset" five years after its enactment in 1986, the chapter of
the Code has been extended numerous times thereafter. On May 7, 2002,
the President signed into law House Bill 4167 which retroactively extended
chapter 12 for eight months, from October 1, 2001, to June 1, 2002.
Additionally part of a much larger agricultural measure, the President signed
the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002,"" which extended
chapter 12 for seven more months, from June 1, 2002, through January 1,
2003. Chapter 12 received yet another temporary six-month extension on
December 19, 2002, when President Bush signed House Bill 5472 that re-
enacted chapter 12 of the Code from January 1, 2003, until July 1, 2003.
Legislation aimed to massively overhaul America's bankruptcy laws contains
306. I1 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2000).
307. In re Stringer, 252 B.R. 900, 901 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2000) (stating tribe members
are amenable to suit if the subject of the suit is not related to a tribal officer's performance
of official duties); Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 63 F.3d
1030 (1I1th Cir. 1995); Buchanan v. Sokaogon Chippewa Tribe, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (E.D.
Wis. 1999); Romanella v. Hayward, 933 F. Supp. 163 (D. Conn. 1996), aff'd, 114 F.3d 15
(2d Cir. 1997); Skowronski v. Branco, 1999 WL 61409 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 1999).
308. Pub. L. No. 99-554, tit. III, §302(f), 100 Stat. 3088, 3124; see Ronald M. Martin,
Bankruptcy Judges, U.S. Trustees, & Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, 16 CoLO. LAW.
221 (1987); see also Elizabeth Marston-Moore, Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, 22
TENN. B.J. 13 (1986).
309. COWANS, supra note 276, § 3.4.
310. Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134.
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provisions making chapter 12 permanent."'
In the event that Congress keeps breathing new life into chapter 12 or
makes it a permanent chapter under the Code, the statutory eligibility
requirements, nevertheless, must be met. Section 109(f) of the Code
expressly states and establishes bankruptcy eligibility for "family
farmers."12 One should also analyze the definition of a "family farmer
with regular annual income" as meaning a family farmer whose annual
income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable a family farmer to make
payments under a chapter 12 plan."' The Code further defines "family
farmer" as including individuals, partnerships, or corporations who have less
than $1.5 million in debt of which 80% must arise from a "farming
operation.""3 " In regard to individual filers, there is an additional re-
quirement that more than 50% of the family farmer's gross income for the
year prior to the filing of the petition must be derived from the farming
operation."5
Corporations and partnerships are eligible under chapter 12 as long as
50% of the corporation's stock or the partnership's equity is held by family
members; one of the members are actually conducting the operation; and
80% of the value of the operations' assets are related to the farming
operation."6 The term "farming operation" also has a statutory definition
which includes a number of types of agribusiness activities." '
Tribes are not expressly defined in the eligibility provisions under chapter
12. Individual members and their business entities may be eligible for
chapter 12 by virtue of their status as corporations as long as the equity,
asset, and ownership composition requirements are met as prescribed in §
101(18) of the Code."' Eligibility for tribal, commercial entities still must
meet the family composition requirement." ' Tribes, in a commercial
capacity, are engaged in many agricultural activities throughout the country
as manifested by the various agricultural organizations officially aligned
with tribes.2
311. Bankruptcy Abuse and Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333,
107th Cong. (2001); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. (2001).
312. 11 U.S.C. § 109(f) (2000).
313. Id. § 101(19).
314. Id. § 101(18), (20).
315. Id. § 101(18)(A).
316. Id. §§ 101(18)(B)(i)-(iii).
317. Id. § 101 (21) (stating that "farming operation" includes "farming, tillage of the soil,
dairy farming, ranching, production or raising of crops, poultry, or livestock, and production
of poultry or livestock products in an unmanufactured state").
318. See id. § 101(18)(B).
319. Id.
320. See, e.g., Dan Looker, A Lesson for Us from the Pawnee and Sioux People,
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The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 expressly permitted tribes to form
business corporations to pursue commercial activities." Tribes, in tribal
and corporate capacities, engage in a diverse array of agriculturally related
activities ranging from the bottling and distributing of water, timber
production, tobacco sales, meat processing and production, and many others.
Like other farmers and agricultural entrepreneurs, tribal corporations and
other formally established business organizations (i.e., a partnership) are
subject to commercial failure necessitating the need for bankruptcy relief.
A tribe, however, fails to expressly fall within the scope of the chapter
12 eligibility provisions. Certain individual tribal members or their
established commercial entities clearly qualify for chapter 12 relief, but a
tribe does not.
Therefore, the confusion exists and the questions remain. What chapter
of the Code offers tribes relief from financial distress? How are tribes
defined as eligible participants as debtors and creditors under the Code?
Perhaps these questions, as well as others, deserve congressional clarification
and statutory refinement.
V. Treatment of Indian Tribes and Sovereign Immunity Under the
Bankruptcy Code
A. The Origins of Indian Tribal Sovereign Immunity
It is frequently said that tribes occupy a unique relationship and status
with the federal government under applicable law." The origins of the
sovereign immunity possessed by tribes is subject to debate and is broken
into two schools of thought. Some scholars assert that tribes possess
inherent sovereign immunity because they are sovereigns predating the
Constitution.323 These scholars consider the tribes, rather than the British
SUCCESSFUL FARMING, May-June 2000 (noting organizations such as the Farmer's Union
tribe, Farm Bureau tribe, and the NFO tribe).
321. COHEN, supra note 16, at 149 (noting that the corporate charters were created under
presumably federal law and issued by Secretary of Interior; thus, the tribes were not
incorporated under the various state legislatures).
322. Letitia Ness, Recent Developments: The Exhausted Doctrine, 24 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 487, 489 (1999-2000).
323. Rupp v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 45 F.3d 1241, 1244 (8th Cir. 1995); Am. Indian
Agric. Credit v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1985); see also
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,559 (1832) (quoting Chief Justice Marshall's ack-
nowledgment that tribes' sovereignty, like that of the states, stems from original natural rights
of their people); THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 81-82 (Knopf 1974) (1791)
(emphasizing the fact that people existed in the new world under natural law prior to the
formation of any established government; thus, Britain formally negotiated with Indian tribes
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and French, as the original title holders of all the land in America. 2 '
This theory is supported by the fact that prior to ratification of the
American Constitution, states and tribes occupied similar positions as
international sovereigns." The source of the immunity enjoyed by each
sovereign entity flows from the fact that tribes existed as sovereign entities
at one time."' Tribes do not derive their original sovereign powers from
congressional delegation; rather, tribal sovereignty is inherent, and unless
that sovereignty has been withdrawn by statute or treaty, tribes retain
sovereign attributes over both their territory and members."2 Others
consider the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity a judicially created
doctrine originating relatively recently in the Supreme Court case Turner v.
United States.'
Regardless of the origin of tribal immunity, sovereign immunity remains
a substantial barrier in legal disputes. For example, a tribe or nation is not
amenable to suit by a bankruptcy trustee, and a bankruptcy courts'
jurisdiction does not operate to defeat a tribes' immune status.3" Tribal
sovereign immunity, however, does not extend to individual tribal members
acting in a personal capacity, or tribal members engaging in activities
relating to their own self-interest or activities unrelated to official, tribal
business." '
Although the debate continues to generate intellectual discussion, the
Constitution introduced the notion of federalism which allowed these
separate and distinct sovereigns to co-exist under a unitary, central
through international treaties).
324. See Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34-35 (1947).
325. Richard A. Monette, When Tribes Sue States: How "Federal Indian Law" Offers
an Opportunity to Clarify Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 401,
410 (1994) [hereinafter Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence].
326. Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship
Between The United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican
Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617, 646 (1994) [hereinafter New Federalism].
327. See Ness, supra note 322, at 489 (citing Kerr McGee Corp. v. Farley, 915 F. Supp.
273, 277 (D.N.M. 1995)).
328. 248 U.S. 354 (1919) (cited as the first time that sovereign immunity in Indian law
was judicially recognized); see also Jordan, supra note 12, at 490-91.
329. In re Stringer, 252 B.R. 900, 901 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2000) (citing In re Greene, 980
F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1039 (1994)); In re Nat'l Cattle Cong., 247
B.R. 259 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000); cf. supra note 155 (citing Sandmar and Shape).
330. Stringer, 252 B.R. at 901; Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians
of Fla., 63 F.3d 1030 (11 th Cir. 1995); Buchanan v. Sokaogon Chippewa Tribe, 40 F. Supp.
2d 1043 (E.D. Wis. 1999); Romanella v. Hayward, 933 F. Supp. 163 (D. Conn. 1996), affd,
114 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997); Skowronski v. Branco, 1999 WL 61409 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb.
1, 1999); In re Kedrowski, 284 B.R. 439, 451 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2002).
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government regardless of the origin of such immunity."' Although a
definition of federalism cannot be specifically articulated into an universally
accepted definition, the principles of federalism clarify and substantiate the
federal government's treatment of tribes in a similar manner as the states. 32
B. The Effect and Impact of Federalist Principles on Sovereign Immunity
In order to more fully appreciate the necessary and inevitable surrender
of sovereign immunity under the Code for both tribes and states, it is helpful
to understand the principles of federalism and the history of tribal sovereign
immunity."' The definition of federalism utilized in this article stands for
"any political system where there is a constitutional distribution of powers
between provincial governments and a central common authority" (i.e., the
U.S. federal system of government).3' Upon an understanding that some
sovereignty is surrendered to the federal government upon entering the union
or accepting the benefits of citizenship in the United States, the idea of
federalism, as it relates to tribes and states, is revealed. In essence, the
acceptance of citizenship and inclusion of tribes and states in the United
States demands surrender of complete sovereignty. With the principles of
federalism in mind, an appreciation of the timing of such a surrender is
informative.
Although some, but not all, of the states became part of the union upon
ratification of the Constitution, the indoctrination of tribes remains in
question and is less clear. 35 Some refer to Chief Justice Marshall's
discussion of the effect of treaties in Worcester v. Georgia as the moment
tribes became part of the Union." Others consider the point of in-
doctrination of the tribes as the time when the United States acted unilateral-
ly and made federal citizens out of all tribes' citizens in 19242"7
Regardless of the specific time tribes surrendered part of their sovereignty,
states and tribes represent provincial governments who surrender some
autonomy to a larger sovereign or central government." Collectively, the
federal government, tribes, and states exist in an intersovereign relationship
similar to the type of relationship the early federalists envisioned as
331. Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, supra note 325, at 410-11.
332. See generally New Federalism, supra note 326, at 618-19.
333. Fredericks, supra note 14, at 409.
334. WALTER HARTWELL BENNETT, AMERICAN THEORIES OF FEDERALISM 10 (1964).
335. Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, supra note 325, at 410-11.
336. Id.
337. Id. (citing Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253).
338. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978) (summarizing the
Court's approach to the sovereignty of Indian tribes by stating that a tribe's sovereignty is
unique and limited in character, subject to complete defeasance by Congress).
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proponents of their vision of the Constitution and ideal form of
government.39
Although tribes fail to derive sovereign immunity from the Eleventh
Amendment as states do, the status of the immunity afforded to states and
tribes is essentially the same." Based on Supreme Court precedent
affording tribes the same protections as offered to the states under the
Eleventh Amendment, this article, like others addressing the issue, analyzes
any such waivers identically." The main question is the level of
sovereignty retained by states and tribes.
It is clear that, due to the inherent limitations on tribal powers stemming
from their inclusion as part of the republic of the United States, tribes, like
states, are not complete sovereigns or independent nations.4 2 The level and
description of the sovereignty retained by tribes is important because it
eliminates the tribes' exposure or ability to participate in lawsuits.' 3 As a
participant in the federal system, however, tribes must yield some of their
sovereignty and accept Supreme Court decisions in accordance with the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution as being the "[s]upreme [lI]aw of the
[Ihand."3' The Constitution represents the starting point in the sovereign
immunity question as it relates to the federal bankruptcy laws.
Principles of federalism require tribes to surrender some of their
inherently possessed sovereignty in order to reap the benefits of citizen-
ship. As the Founders anticipated at the Federal Convention of 1787,
one supreme power must be established to resolve inherent conflicts among
multiple sovereign entities in a republican form of government.' In the
event the Constitution granted express and exclusive authority to the federal
government, similar authority exercised by the states or tribes would be
339. Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, supra note 325, at 410-11.
340. Wilson, supra note 12, at 123.
341. Id. at 124; see, e.g., United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506
(1940) (holding that neither the tribe nor its tribal officials could be subjected to nonconsen-
sual suit in any forum); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (stating tribes
and tribal officials are immune from suit, unless such immunity is waived by either Congress
or the tribe).
342. See Johnson v. M'ntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823); Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe. 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
323 (1978).
343. New Federalism, supra note 326, at 641.
344. Eric B. Schnurer, The Inadequate and Dependent "Adequate and Independent State
Grounds" Doctrine, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 371, 374 (1991).
345. Id.
346. New Federalism, supra note 326, at 624 (citing NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE




TRIBES UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
contradictory and repugnant. ' These principles guide one to the ultimate
conclusion that the power over commercial activities, bankruptcy, and tribes
belongs to Congress.'
C. Congressional and Judicial Interpretation Regarding Sovereign
Immunity
The Supreme Court accepted congressional or federal supremacy in
commercial areas affecting interstate commerce as manifested in Pennsyl-
vania v. Union Gas Co.49 In this decision, the Court held that Congress
can abrogate the sovereign immunity of a state or perhaps, any other
domestic sovereign government, when legislating pursuant to the plenary
powers granted to it in Article I of the Constitution.35" Additionally, the
Court held that Congress has the power to abrogate immunity when
exercising its plenary authority to regulate interstate commerce."'
In 1996, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida35 overruled Union Gas
specifically abrogating any congressional authority to waive a state's
sovereign immunity pursuant to the Commerce or Indian Commerce
clauses."3 While it is true that Seminole Tribe, a nonbankruptcy opinion,
stands for the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment protects and
solidifies only the states' sovereign immunity against Congress's power to
create general legislation such as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988
(IGRA), other governmental units remain unaffected by the decision."4 As
stated, tribes constitute sovereign entities. Treaties, and the constitutional
provisions addressing tribes, call for treating tribes as states under federal
law even though the Eleventh Amendment only applies to states.3"
347. T1E FEDERALIST No. 32 (James Madison).
348. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3-4 (vesting Congress with the right to regulate
commerce and establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies); see also In re
Bliemeister, 251 B.R. 383 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2000) (holding that sovereignty is alienated as
manifested in Hamilton's The Federalist No. 81 and 32, emphasizing the constitutionally
granted power of Congress to establish uniform and distinct rules on the subject of
bankruptcies, and that the states retained no more sovereign power over bankruptcy law than
they did over naturalization); Leonard H. Gerson, A Bankruptcy Exception to the Eleventh
Amendment Immunity: Limiting the Seminole Tribe Doctrine, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 11
(2000).
349. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
350. Id. at 15.
351. Id.
352. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
353. Id.
354. Nat'l Bankruptcy Review Comm'n, supra note 280, at 900; see also Elizabeth
Gibson, Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy: The Next Chapter, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 201
(1996).
355. Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, supra note 325, at 412-15; see also New
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Because tribes and states are constitutionally afforded similar rights, it is
necessary to consider the possible effect Seminole Tribe may have upon a
tribe in a bankruptcy case.
In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court failed to directly address whether
the Eleventh Amendment confers immunity on a state from suit in a
bankruptcy court; however, no other case has invoked more debate regarding
Article I of the Constitution, the Eleventh Amendment, and sovereign
immunity."' Specifically, Justice Stevens' dissent raised the issue when he
characterized the majority opinion as suggesting that "persons harmed by
state violations of federal copyright, bankruptcy, and anti-trust laws" may
have no remedy as a result of this decision." '
Despite the majority's response to Justice Stevens's concern about the
enforceability of "the federal bankruptcy laws against the states as exag-
gerated in substance and form," the reference to bankruptcy cases catapulted
the Eleventh Amendment issue into bankruptcy courts throughout the
country." Considering the inconsistent and controversial application of
Seminole Tribe, the sovereign immunity issue must be considered in a
factual context to more fully appreciate the dynamics of the sovereign
immunity issue and the application of Seminole Tribe as applied to tribes in
bankruptcy cases."9
D. Indian Tribes as Participants Under the Bankruptcy Code and
Sovereign Immunity
As noted, an "Indian tribe" or tribal business has yet to file for
bankruptcy protection. In the event a tribe files a bankruptcy petition,
eligibility to be a debtor under the Code and waiver of sovereign immunity
must be considered. Assuming that a tribe is a qualified entity eligible for
relief under the Code, a tribe's voluntary act of filing a petition may be
considered a waiver of the tribe's sovereign immunity.
Federalism, supra note 326, at 633. But see Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372
(8th Cir. 1895) (addressing the fact that Indian tribes are immune from suit and are placed
on the same plane occupied by the states under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution).
356. Richard Lieb, Bankruptcy After Seminole Tribe - New Currents of Legal Thought,
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Aug. 1998, at I; see also Janet A. Flaccus, The Eleventh
Amendment and Bankruptcy Jurisdiction over States, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 207 (2001).
357. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 77 n.I (Stevens, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 73 n.16.
359. See In re York-Hannover Dev., Inc. 181 B.R. 271 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1995); In re
Willis, 230 B.R. 619 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1999); In re Renstrom, 215 B.R. 454 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1997); In re Straight, 248 B.R. 403,421-30 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000) (dissenting opinion).
Contra, e.g., In re Mitchell, 222 B.R. 877 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); In re Morrell, 218 B.R.
87 (Bankr. C,D. Cal. 1997); In re Taylor, 249 B.R. 571 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000).
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Because tribes are generally immune from suit in state or federal court,
any waiver of tribal sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed
and may not be implied.' Relying on language in the landmark tribal
sovereign immunity case Turner v. United States," courts have held that
a tribe, without congressional consent, -can waive its inherent sovereign
immunity. 2 The conclusion that a tribe may waive its sovereign immunity
rests on the premise that the initiation of a lawsuit or bankruptcy protection
equates to the tribe necessarily consenting to a court's jurisdiction to
determine all the claims, except in some instances counterclaims, brought in
a given lawsuit.'
In United States v. Oregon,' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that tribes can waive sovereign immunity and consent to suit
absent explicit, congressional authority. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in concurrence with the Tenth, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits and guided by
Turner, held that tribes may consent to suit without explicit congressional
authority. ' Moreover, the court stated clear policy considerations, such
as Indian self-determination and other economic development programs,
360. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); United States v. Testan,
424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); cf. Rupp v. Omaha
Indian Tribe, 45 F.3d 1241, 1244 (8th Cir. 1995) (seeming to allow an implied waiver of the
tribe's sovereign immunity). But see COHEN, supra note 16, at 325 (stating that Indian tribes
cannot waive immunity by contract affecting trust property without secretarial or congres-
sional consent).
361. 248 U.S. 354, 359 (1919) (stating that the tribe could not be sued "at least [not]
without its consent").
362. Id. at 358-59; see also Wilson, supra note 12, at 111 (stating that Turner is integral
in understanding the Supreme Court's current attitude toward the doctrine of tribal immunity);
Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 173 (1977) (stating that neither the
Tribe or Congress had waived its immunity or consented to suit); United States v. Oregon,
657 F.2d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1981); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 540
(10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted on other issues, 449 U.S. 820 (1980); Fontenelle v.
Omaha Tribe of Neb., 430 F.2d 143, 147 (8th Cir. 1970); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank of W. Hollywood, 361 F.2d 517, 520-21 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 918 (1966).
363. COHEN, supra note 16, at 325; see also United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009,
1014 (9th Cir. 1981). But see United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940)
(stating the consent does not extend to counterclaims).
364. 657 F.2d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Ann Donnelly, Immunity Hurts
Tribes and Rest of Us, COLUMBIAN, Jan. 18, 1998, at B I (discussing the need for clarification
or relinquishment of Indian tribal sovereign immunity in order to assure outside investors that
their legal rights will be protected in the event of a dispute).
365. Merrion, 617 F.2d at 540; Fontenelle, 430 F.2d at 147; Maryland Cas. Co., 361
F.2d at 520-21. But see Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912) (holding that Indian
tribes must obtain congressional consent prior to waiving sovereign immunity in the event
restricted property is subject to taking).
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substantiate a tribe's power to consent to suit." A tribe's right of self-
determination in the form of economic freedom, commercial self-sufficiency,
and financial independence is best served when tribes are able to transact
business with non-Indian entities.' Waivers of sovereign immunity
facilitate such commercial involvement from nontribal entities while
concomitantly assuaging fears asserted by attorneys representing nontribal
businesses in negotiations with tribes that any judgments for nonpayment
may not be enforced due to jurisdictional disputes.'"
For example, a tribe may own 100% of a commercial business and be
judgment proof by virtue of its inherent sovereign immunity; however, a
tribe may seek to waive its immunity in order to encourage and facilitate
outside investment. Outside investors are encouraged by such waivers
because in the event conflicts arise between the parties, costly jurisdictional
disputes and posturing are avoided. Another way a tribe can waive its
immunity is by initiating a lawsuit and submitting a controversy to a
nontribal court.'
A tribe filing for protection under the Code closely resembles a tribe's act
of filing a lawsuit in a federal district court to resolve, for example, a land
ownership dispute. Once the tribe, as plaintiff, files suit in a federal court,
the tribe cannot object to the court's jurisdiction because it impliedly
consented to the court's retention of jurisdiction by filing suit in that court.
By analogy, it is equivalent to the restriction that a plaintiff cannot assert
improper venue after voluntary initiating a lawsuit in that court, or a
defendant objecting to a court's jurisdiction after actively participating in a
case without raising the issues before the implied waiver. Therefore, a tribe
could voluntarily utilize any federal court without jurisdictional im-
pediments.
For example, in Rupp v. Omaha Indian Tribe,"' ' the court held that a
tribe waived its sovereign immunity by filing suit in the district court,
requesting equitable relief in that forum."' Factually, the tribe brought a
quiet title action against two individuals holding legal title to tracts of land;
the tribe claimed a presumptive right of possession and title. The court held
that upon the initiation of the lawsuit, the tribe "necessarily consents to the
366. Oregon, 657 F.2d at 1014.
367. Id.
368. Jordan, supra note 12, at 506.
369. Oregon, 657 F.2d at 1013 (stating that the initiation of a lawsuit necessarily
establishes consent to the court's adjudication of the merits of a particular controversy).
370. 45 F.3d 1241 (8th Cir. 1995).
371. Id. at 1245.
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court's jurisdiction to determine the claims brought adversely to it."3"
Furthermore, the tribe, as the plaintiff, insisted the district court resolve the
dispute in question. Despite the tribe's sovereign status, the tribe agreed that
the court possessed jurisdiction, and the tribe ultimately assumed the risk of
an adverse determination."
Like Rupp, a tribe filing a voluntary petition under the Code submits to
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. It is noted that implied waivers are
prohibited, and the simple filing of the petition may not be sufficient to
constitute such a waiver of sovereign immunity." An express, une-
quivocal, and explicit waiver can be executed upon a tribe's voluntary filing
or active, voluntary participation in a case or proceeding under the Code.
As stated, the Supreme Court held that this waiver can be accomplished
without congressional consent?75
The court clarified a tribe's ability to waive sovereign immunity in
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. VAL-U Construction Co. of South Dakota and
recently confirmed its analysis in a similar case, C & L Enterprises, Inc. v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma.7 Although the
Rosebud court recognized the strong policy supporting tribal sovereignty and
the prohibition against implied waivers of sovereign immunity, the court
refused to allow a tribe to void an arbitration clause based on the tribes'
sovereign status.3" The court, relying on Rupp, refused to demand that
"magic words" be utilized to waive sovereign immunity."" The court
ordered the tribe to adhere to a contractual arbitration provision stating that
the parties voluntarily entered into the contract, and the agreement should
be honored. The court specifically emphasized the definitive need for courts
to uphold such provisions despite assertions of sovereign immunity."
372. Id.; COHEN, supra note 16, at 324; see also Oregon, 657 F.2d at 1014.
373. Rupp, 45 F.3d at 1245.
374. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (prohibiting implied
waivers).
375. See, e.g., Oregon, 657 F.2d at 1013; Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358
(1919); C & L Enter., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411
(2001).
376. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. VAL-U Const. Co. of S.D., 50 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1995);
C & L Enter., Inc., 532 U.S. at 411.
377. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 50 F.3d at 563.
378. id. But see Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) (holding
that Indian tribes enjoy immunity from suits on contracts including contracts covering
commercial and governmental activities made on or off the reservation).
379. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 50 F.3d at 562 (citing Native Village of Eyak v. GC
Contractors, 658 P.2d 756, 760 (Alaska 1983)).
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Similarly, bankruptcy cases and proceedings are disputes involving
valuable property interests (i.e., the property of the estate under § 541 of the
Code). The adversarial nature of these disputes requires the parties to
formally submit arguments to the court or some forum for adjudication.
Therefore, a tribe's participation in a bankruptcy case is not a foreign or
extreme concept. In fact, tribal participation in a bankruptcy case, like other
lawsuits involving tribes, is quite feasible despite their status as sovereigns.
Statutorily, a tribes' sovereign immunity is not absolute. It exists only at
the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance"8 '
Because tribal immunity may be abrogated by a congressional act, § 106(a)
of the Code comes into play.
E. II U.S. C. § 106, Governmental Units, and the Abrogation of
Sovereign Immunity Under the Bankruptcy Code
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1994, Congress amended § 106 of the Code
clearly demarcating Congress' intent to abrogate sovereign immunity of
governmental units.3"' The intention of Congress was to explicitly abrogate
sovereign immunity assertions by governmental units and preclude such
assertions of sovereign immunity involving all sorts of legal and equitable
relief." However, the validity and constitutionality of § 106 is in doubt
after Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a): An Indian Tribe as a Governmental Unit
The specific section of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 106(a), abrogating the
sovereign immunity of "governmental units," states as follows:
106. Waiver of sovereign immunity
(a) Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity,
sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the
extent set forth in this section with respect to the following:
(1) Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 303, 346, 362, 363, 364, 365,
366, 502, 503, 505, 506, 510, 522, 523, 524, 525, 542, 543, 544,
545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 722, 724, 726, 728,
380. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 560-63 (1981); Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061, 1066 (st Cir.
1979).
381. H.R. REP. No. 103-835 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340; In re
Vianese, 195 B.R. 572, 575 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995); In re York-Hannover Dev., Inc., 181
B.R. 271,273 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1995); see also In re Bison Heating & Equip., Inc., 177 B.R.
785, 788 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that the Bankruptcy Code has significantly
enlarged the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity).
382. 1 COLLIER, supra note 134, § 106.01.
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744, 749, 764, 901, 922, 926, 928, 929, 944, 1107, 1141, 1142,
1143, 1146, 1201, 1203, 1205, 1206, 1227, 1231, 1301, 1303,
1305, and 1327 of this title.
(2) The court may hear and determine any issue arising with
respect to the application of such sections to governmental units.
(3) The court may issue against a governmental unit an order,
process, or judgment under such sections or the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, including an order or judgment awarding
a money recovery, but not including an award of punitive
damages. Such order or judgment for costs or fees under this title
or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure against any
governmental unit shall be consistent with the provisions and
limitations of section 2412(d)(2)(A) of title 28.
(4) The enforcement of any such order, process, or judgment
against any governmental unit shall be consistent with appropriate
nonbankruptcy law applicable to such governmental unit and, in
the case of a money judgment against the United States, shall be
paid as if it is a judgment rendered by a district court of the
United States.
(5) Nothing in this section shall create any substantive claim for
relief or cause of action not otherwise existing under this title, the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, or nonbankruptcy law. 3
By meticulously listing the sixty enumerated sections and provisions of the
Code, the Congress clearly intended to abrogate sovereign immunity in regard
to "governmental units." Obviously, the stated assumption that a tribe is a
governmental unit is fundamental to the argument that § 106(a) of the Code
applies. This assumption is subject to considerable debate.
Interestingly, several courts have determined that Indian tribes are
governmental units.' These courts identified Indian tribes as governmental
units under § 101(27) or § 101(15) as constituting an "entity."' " In In re
Vianese, the bankruptcy court held that tribes qualified as governmental units
as defined under the Code. In In re Vianese, an Indian tribe - the Oneida
Indian Nation of New York - operated a casino on the tribe's reservation in
Verona, New York. The tribe filed a complaint to determine the dischar-
383. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000).
384. In re Vianese, 195 B.R. 572, 576 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that § 106(a)
of the Code, as applied to Indian tribes, includes domestic dependant nations and are
governmental units); In re Sandmar Corp., 12 B.R. 910, 916 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981) (holding
that an Indian tribe is a governmental unit under the § 101 definition).
385. 11 U.S.C. § 101(15) (2000).
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geability of a debt under § 523(a)(2) of the Code." The court allowed the
imposition of attorney's fees against the tribe despite the tribe's assertion of
sovereign immunity."'
The court held that § 106(a) abrogated the tribe's sovereign immunity
because a tribe is a governmental unit as defined in § 101(27) of the
Code."' The court determined that tribes are "domestic dependent nations"
with the right to internally govern and prescribe laws governing tribal
members on their reservations." The court noted that no statute or treaty
grants Indian nations the right to litigate bankruptcy issues with non-Indians,
nor did the bankruptcy court infringe upon the sovereignty of the tribal
tribunals. " ' The court proceeded by relying on Rupp v. Omaha Indian
Tribe9 ' by emphasizing the doctrine of mutuality and stating that a plaintiff
who commences an adversary proceeding "necessarily consents to the Court's
jurisdiction to determine related claims brought adversely against it.""
Assuming the tribe failed to waive its sovereign immunity by filing the
dischargeability complaint, the court further analyzed sovereign immunity.'
The court noted that tribal immunity exists only at the sufferance of Congress
and is subject to complete defeasance.3 ' The court also emphasized that the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 amended § 106 to make it "unmistakably
clear" that Congress intended to abrogate sovereign immunity in regard to
governmental units.39 Interestingly, the court summarily concluded that
386. See id. § 523(a)(2)(A)(B),(d); Vianese, 195 B.R. at 575 (involving the filing by a
tribe of an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt arising out of a
bad check written for an extension of credit in order to gamble at the casino, and involves
an attempt by the debtor's wife, the co-debtor, to receive attorneys fees under § 523(d)
alleging that inclusion of the innocent spouse was unjustified).
387. Vianese, 195 B.R. at 576-77.
388. Id. at 576.
389. Id. at 575.
390. Id.
391. 45 F.3d 1241 (8th Cir. 1995).
392. Vianese, 195 B.R. at 575 (citing Rupp, 45 F.3d at 1245); see also In re PNP
Holdings Corp., 184 B.R. 805, 807 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (substantiating the view that "[a]
creditor cannot reasonably expect to invoke those portions of the bankruptcy code that allow
it to recover on its claims and yet [totally] avoid the legal effect of the other sections [of the
Code] that do not work in its favor").
393. Vianese, 195 B.R. at 575.
394. Id. (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)).
395. Id. (citing In re York-Hannover Dev., Inc., 181 B.R. 271, 273 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
1995); see also In re Bison Heating & Equip., Inc., 177 B.R. 785, 788 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
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tribes are "governmental units" as defined in § 101(27) and § 106 expressly
abrogates a governmental unit's sovereignty.
The court arrived at this conclusion by assuming that Indian nations are
"domestic dependent nations" and automatically comprise or constitute
"governmental units" within § 101(27).96 Despite the fact that the term
"domestic dependent nation(s)" is not found in the definition of § 101(27),
the court classified tribes as "domestic dependent nations." Similarly, other
courts classify tribes as governmental units when addressing the sovereignty
issue.
In In re National Cattle Congress, the debtor relied on In re Vianese and
In re Sandmar by arguing that § 106(a) unequivocally abrogated the
sovereign immunity of tribes asserting that the tribes were "governmental
units" as defined in § 101(27)." ' The debtor assumed that the tribe, a
creditor in the case, constituted a governmental unit and that § 106
categorically abrogated the tribe's sovereign immunity. However, the court
failed to accept the fact that congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign
immunity can be implied. 9"
The court expressed the need for specific inclusion or for the statute to
expressly mention that the particular statute applied to "Indian tribes" to
accomplish an express, unequivocal, congressional abrogation of tribal
sovereignty.' Perhaps, the court recognized that Congress expressly
incorporates and defines tribes when a federal statute applies to tribes as
manifested in multiple federal statutes, discussed in supra Part II. The court
refused to recognize that tribes are subject to suit because the term "Indian
tribe" was not specifically included in § 101(27).'' Therefore, the court
held that Congress failed to unequivocally abrogate the tribe's immunity from
suit."'
If Congress specifically included tribes in the definition of the term
"governmental unit,"" such inclusion of the term Indian tribe would
396. Vianese, 195 B.R. at 576.
397. Id.; In re Sandmar Corp., 12 B.R. 910, 916 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1981); In re Nat'l
Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. 259, 266 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000).
398. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
399. Nat'l Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. at 267; see also Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe,
204 F.3d 343, 357-58 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding Indian tribe immune from suit under the
Copyright Act); Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d
1126, 1131 (11th Cir. 1999).
400. Nat'l Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. at 266.
401. Id.
402. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2000) (defining "governmental unit" as meaning "United
States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department,
agency, or instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States trustee while serving
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recognize the explicit abrogation of sovereign immunity in § 106(a). Such
clarification would eliminate the debate as to whether a tribe's sovereign
immunity eliminates its ability or eligibility to file for protection under the
Code. In the event a tribe was involved in a bankruptcy case or proceeding,
and Congress expressly adds Indian tribes within the definition of
governmental unit in § 101(27), and the controversy invokes a section listed
in § 106(a), a court could find that Congress abrogated a tribe's sovereign
immunity.
Of course, the two constitutional requirements allowing abrogation of
sovereign immunity must be met. In order for the court to abrogate sovereign
immunity, Congress must unequivocally express its intent to abrogate the
sovereign's immunity, and Congress must act in accordance with its valid
exercise of power.' Possibly, these two requirements are met because §
106(a) is an unequivocal act of Congress, and Congress wields the requisite
constitutional power under the Indian commerce and bankruptcy clauses in
Article I of the Constitution.
It is noted that Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida only declared § 106(a)
unconstitutional as it applied to the states because of the Eleventh
Amendment.* Thus, Congress can act, pursuant to its specifically
enumerated Article I powers (i.e., the Indian commerce and bankruptcy
clauses), in regulating and abrogating the sovereignty and rights of tribes.'
Arguably, tribal immunity may be pierced solely by congressional act. "
Additionally, because the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to the
federal government, § 106(a) serves as explicit congressional consent to the
abrogation of sovereign immunity of federal governmental units (i.e., the IRS
or other federal government units), and the section contains Congress's
explicit and necessary consent to such suits against these federal, governmen-
tal units.' 0
as a trustee in a case under this title), a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a
municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government").
403. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996).
404. 1 COLLIER, supra note 134, § 106.0211].
405. United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981);
Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061, 1066 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating that Indian
tribe's sovereign immunity is not absolute and is subject to the sufferance of, and complete
defeasance by, Congress); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 (the bankruptcy clause); id. art. I, §
8, cl. 3.
406. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d
152, 158-59 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972).
407. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 227 (1882); Thibodaux v. United States, 201
B.R. 827, 832 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996).
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In the event a tribe is classified as a "federal governmental unit," § 106(a)
may abrogate a tribe's sovereign immunity. Until the Supreme Court
specifically addresses the sovereignty issue in regard to the constitutionality
of § 106 of the Code in the context of a given bankruptcy case, courts
probably will continue to render creative opinions addressing the issue."
Interestingly, § 106(b) provides another mechanism for a governmental unit
to waive its sovereign immunity - the filing of a proof of claim.
2. 11 U.S. C. § 106(b): The Effect of Filing a Proof of Claim
When a governmental unit files a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case, §
106(b) provides that the governmental unit's sovereign immunity is
waived." Despite the controversy regarding the constitutionality of § 106,
it generally is held that a state or any sovereign for that matter, voluntarily
invokes the jurisdiction of the federal courts upon the filing of a proof of
claim.4"'
A proof of claim is the traditional method for collecting a debt in a
bankruptcy case. "" With some exceptions, the filing of a proof of claim is
a prerequisite to the allowance of that claim on the assets of the bankruptcy
estate.412 The act of filing a proof of claim ordinarily results in the volun-
tary submission by creditors to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction for
adjudication of the particular claims.413 Rule 3002(c) of the Federal Rules
408. See Kelli B. Dexter, The Bankruptcy Estate v. The State, Round 11: Recent
Developments in Sovereign Immunity, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 41, 56 (2000).
409. 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) (2000); Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565 (1947); In re
White, 139 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 1998).
410. Dexter, supra note 408, at 56 (citing In re Rose, 187 F.3d. 926, 928 (8th Cir.
1999)); see College Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 681 n.3 (1999); see also In re Jackson, 184 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999); In re
Burlington Motor Holdings, Inc., 242 B.R. 156, 160 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999); In re Eli Witt
Co., 243 B.R. 528, 530 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999); Univ. of Va. v. Robertson, 243 B.R. 657,
662 (W.D. Va. 2000); In re Janc, 251 B.R. 525, 534 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000). But see In
re Straight, 248 B.R. 403, 414 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000) (refusing to hold that filing a proof
of claim equates to a waiver of sovereign immunity because such a holding would run
counter to the Supreme Court's insistence on strictly construing waivers of sovereign
immunity).
411. Gardner, 329 U.S. at 573; see I COLLIER, supra note 134, § 501.01 [11 (clarifying
that § 101 of the Code defines "claim" broadly, but § 501 of the Code, "Filing of Proofs of
Claims or Interests," clearly denotes that proofs of claims are utilized for prepetition debts).
412. 1 COLLIER, supra note 134, § 501[2][a]. Whether a claim is allowed or not is
determined according to its own set of variables under § 502 of the Code.
413. See In re S.G. Phillips Constructors, Inc. v. City of Burlington, 45 F.3d 702, 705
(2d. Cir. 1995) (discussing that the filing of a proof of claim confers jurisdiction on the
bankruptcy court as a core matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B)).
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of Bankruptcy Procedure governs the filing of a proof of claim in a chapter
7, 12, or 13 case. Rule 3003(c) governs the filing of proofs of claims when
the debts are scheduled in a chapter 9 or 11 case as being disputed,
contingent, or unliquidatedY'4 With a general understanding of proofs of
claims in bankruptcy cases, one can appreciate the legislative intent of 11
U.S.C. § 106(b).
The plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) states as follows:
A governmental unit that has filed a proof of claim in the case is
deemed to have waived sovereign immunity with respect to a
claim against such governmental unit that is property of the estate
and that arose out of the same transaction or occurrence out of
which the claim of such governmental unit arose.""
The legislative history reveals the intent underlying § 106.1'6 In the 1994
amendments to the Code, the goal of the revised version of § 106(b) was to
clarify conflicting case law and statutorily declare governmental units subject
to counterclaims only in cases where the governmental unit filed a proof of
claim." The overhaul of § 106 in 1994 clarified the split of case law
regarding the balance between the historic doctrines of sovereign immunity
and the rights of governmental units. ' Despite the 1994 amendments and
the legislative history, the scope and effect of filing a proof of claim remain
in question as well as the constitutional validity of § 106(b) and constructive
waivers.419
Although the obvious disagreement regarding the effect of filing a proof
of claim exists, bankruptcy courts have held that the mere act of filing a
414. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(c), 3003(c); see also 11 U.S.C. § I I I I(a) (2000).
415. 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) (2000).
416. See 140 CONG. REC. HIO,752-66 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (offering details regarding
the debate concerning the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 in the House of Representatives).
417. Id. at 10,755.
418. Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic and
Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 37-38 (1994) (statement of
Rep. Berman, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary).
419. See, e.g., In re Rose 215 B.R. 755 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (holding a governmen-
tal unit to any unfavorable result upon the filing of a proof of claim); In re Straight, 143 F.3d
1387 (10th Cir. 1998) (expansively holding that the filing of a proof of claim by a state
agency broadly waives the sovereign's immunity); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (College Savings Bank I). In 1999, the Supreme
Court answered any further questions regarding governmental unit immunity in College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educational Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666,
681 n.3 (1999) (College Savings Bank II) (commenting that Gardner "stands for the
unremarkable proposition that a State waives its sovereign immunity by voluntarily invoking
the jurisdiction of the federal courts").
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proof of claim in a bankruptcy case constitutes a waiver of sovereign
immunity.4"" In 1947, the Supreme Court, in Gardner v. New Jersey, made
clear that filing a claim against a debtor in bankruptcy waives the immunity
with respect to adjudication of that claim.4"' Bankruptcy courts addressing
tribal sovereign immunity, and the effect of a tribe filing a proof of claim,
have reached a similar result in cases involving states and sovereign
immunity.
In In re White, the court held that a tribal agency waived its sovereign
immunity by properly filing a proof of claim and objecting to confirmation
in a bankruptcy case.4' Factually, a member of the tribe borrowed money
from the tribal credit agency and later filed bankruptcy under chapter 11. The
court expressly recognized the sovereign status of the tribal credit agency as
a wholly operated unit run by the tribe. 23 The court proceeded by relying
on Gardner v. New Jersey, stating "that when a sovereign files a claim
against a debtor in bankruptcy, the sovereign waives immunity with respect
to adjudication of the claim." ''
In its analysis, the White court relied heavily on Gardner, emphasizing that
the active participation of the tribal credit agency in the bankruptcy case
paralleled the actions resulting in a waiver for the State of New Jersey. '
The court held that the active participation and collection efforts of the tribal
agency (a sovereign entity), including actions such as objecting to plan
confirmation and filing a proof of claim, resulted in a waiver of any
immunity possibly asserted with respect to the adjudication of the claim.26
Apparently, some courts treat tribes in a fashion similar to states under §
106(b) of the Code especially regarding the effect of filing a proof of claim.
In In re National Cattle Congress, a district court reached a similar
conclusion despite the creative tactics employed by a tribe. ' Knowing the
established effect of filing a proof of claim and tribal sovereign immunity,
the tribe filed a proof of claim attached with a "Waiver Disclaimer" expressly
retaining its sovereign immunity from adversary proceedings.4 ' The court
420. Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565 (1947); In re White, 139 F.3d 1268, 1271
(9th Cir. 1998); In re Rose, 187 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 1999); In re Burke, 146 F.3d 1313,
1319-20 (1 th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1043 (1999).
421. Gardner, 329 U.S. at 573-74.
422. In re White, 139 F.3d at 1271.
423. Id.; see also In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590, 598 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that wholly
owned commercial businesses enjoy sovereign immunity).
424. White, 139 F.3d at 1271 (citing Gardner, 329 U.S. at 567).
425. Id.
426. Id. at 1273.
427. 247 B.R. 259, 268 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
428. Id. at 264 (asserting that the waiver disclaimer preserves all rights regarding its
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discussed the applicability of the bankruptcy laws on tribes and the effect of
the tribe's filing the proof of claim.
The court began its analysis with the determination that the Code, as a
general statute having broad application, applies to tribes because Congress
did not specifically except tribes from the Code's application.' Deter-
mining that the Code applied to tribes, the court turned to the jurisdictional
issues; specifically, the court addressed whether sovereign immunity applied,
barring suits against tribes.
The National Cattle Congress court held that the tribe is not subject to suit
because the term "Indian tribe" is not specifically included in the § 101(27)
definition of "governmental unit."'' The court stated that an inference that
Congress intended to include Indian tribes in the definition is contrary to
Supreme Court pronouncements that usurpation of tribal immunity must be
unequivocally expressed.43'
As discussed earlier, the court in National Cattle Congress failed to
determine that tribes, like states, are subject to the statutory waiver of
sovereign immunity under § 106(a). 3" The court thoroughly addressed the
effect of a tribe filing a proof of claim with an express reservation of its
sovereign status. The court held that the initial filing of the proof of claim
with the "Waiver Disclaimer" preserved the tribe's sovereign immunity. 33
The court held, however, that the tribe's action of continuing to maintain a
proof of claim in a bankruptcy case contradicts an assertion of sovereign
immunity.'
mortgage lien). The court stated:
By filing a proof of claim, the Tribe does not intend to participate in or submit
to any plan of reorganization or in any way compromise its secured interest.
Nor does the Tribe intend, by this filing, to submit to the jurisdiction of this or
any other forum with regard to any adversary proceeding. The Tribe hereby
expressly retains its sovereign immunity from adversary proceedings. Claim No.
16, Waiver Disclaimer (filed Mar. 20, 1998)).
Id.
429. Id. (stating that the Code applies to Indian tribes because its general application
does not interfere with any treaty, right to self-governance, or contradict congressional
intent); see also Aubertin v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 446 F. Supp. 430, 435 (E.D.
Wash. 1978) (stating that the Bankruptcy Act is an implied waiver of tribal immunity and
that the bankruptcy court has the authority to discharge a debt owed to an Indian tribe).
430. Nat'l Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. at 267; cf, In re Vianese, 195 B.R. 575, 576 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1995); In re Sandmar Corp., 12 B.R. 901, 916 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981).
431. Nat'l Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. at 267.
432. Id.
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Therefore, the court upheld the legislative intent regarding § 106(b)
holding that the tribe must either withdraw its proof of claim or retract the
"Waiver Disclaimer" from the proof of claim.3' The court seemed to agree
with Gardner regarding the effect of filing a proof of claim while con-
comitantly allowing the tribe to carefully determine whether it desired to
waive its immunity by continuing to pursue its proof of claim or retain its
sovereign immunity.'
Under § 106, tribes, like the federal and state governments, enjoy
sovereign immunity. 3' Congress, exercising its plenary authority, may
waive the tribes' sovereign immunity as long as the waiver is clearly
expressed.' Arguably, a tribe may waive its protection as a sovereign and
impliedly consent to a court's jurisdiction by instituting an action in a given
court or filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case. 3"
The confusion surrounding § 106 and sovereign immunity remains a topic
of considerable debate in bankruptcy fora with states as well as tribes.
Congressional or judicial clarification on the sovereign immunity issue will
eliminate confusion for many participants in the bankruptcy system, including
state agencies as well as other sovereigns such as tribes. Until further, needed
clarification is provided, the sovereignty issue remains another problem in the
eligibility and applicability of the federal bankruptcy laws as applied to
tribes.
VI. Conclusions
This article attempts to manifest a real and compelling need for Congress
to specifically clarify the status (e.g., eligibility) and related provisions
regarding the treatment of tribes who may seek relief under the Bankruptcy
Code (and also whether tribes are vulnerable to involuntary bankruptcy
435. Id. at 268-69; see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 3006 (allowing a creditor to withdraw
a proof of claim as a matter of right unless an objection to the claim is filed, the creditor
accepts or rejects the plan, or the creditor participates significantly in the case).
436. See Smith v. Dowden, 47 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that withdrawal
of a claim under FED. R. BANKR. P. 3006 renders a claim a legal nullity treating that claim
as though it has never been filed).
437. COHEN, supra note 16, at 324.
438. Id.
439. id. (citing Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation,
439 U.S. 463 (1979)); see also Big Spring v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 767 F.2d 614 (9th
Cir. 1985) (standing for the proposition that Indian tribes probably possess the authority to
waive sovereign immunity); In re Davis Chevrolet, Inc., 282 B.R. 674 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002)
(substantiating the theory that an Indian tribe waives its sovereign immunity when it files
proofs of claim in a chapter 7 case consistent with the intent and legislative effect of filing
a proof of claim as proscribed in § 106(b) of the Code).
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petitions). Because tribes today are commercially diverse and enterprising,
Congress should recognize the ultimate economic reality of some inevitable
business failures of tribes with resulting legal issues under the Code. In order
to clarify the eligibility of tribes who may seek bankruptcy protection,
Congress should settle the controversy through appropriate legislation or
statutory amendment to the Code. Such a clarification to the Code would
avoid a potentially lengthy and dilatory controversy as well as promote
uniformity in the various bankruptcy courts addressing the eligibility of tribes
under the Code. Finally, the suggested legislative solutions would help foster
the goal set forth in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1001, "to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and
proceeding.'"
440. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001.
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